University of South Florida

Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

11-12-2016

The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: Assessing the
Impact of Informing Jurors of Verdict
Consequences
Erin Elizabeth Cotrone
University of South Florida, eec232@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons, and the Psychology Commons
Scholar Commons Citation
Cotrone, Erin Elizabeth, "The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: Assessing the Impact of Informing Jurors of Verdict Consequences"
(2016). Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/6486

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
scholarcommons@usf.edu.

The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict:
Assessing the Impact of Informing Jurors of Verdict Consequences

by

Erin E. Cotrone

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Criminology
College of Behavioral and Community Sciences
University of South Florida

Co-Major Professor: John Cochran, Ph.D.
Co-Major Professor: Shayne Jones, Ph.D.
Wesley Jennings, Ph.D.
Ojmarrh Mitchell, Ph.D.

Date of Approval:
November 9, 2016

Keywords: juror decision-making, insanity defense, dispositional consequences, attitudes
Copyright © 2016, Erin E. Cotrone

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to give special thanks to my chair and mentor, Dr. Shayne Jones. Thank you
for sticking with me. I know that I did not make this journey simple, but you were always patient
and encouraging when I needed it the most. You offered me sound advice, some that I did not
want to hear at the time, but I now know was pivotal to my completion of this project. I would
also like to acknowledge my committee members: Dr. John Cochran, Dr. Ojmarrh Mitchell, and
Dr. Wesley Jennings. I sincerely appreciate your thoughtful comments and suggestions.
I would not have made it through this process without the unwavering love and support
of my family. To my parents: You have always gone to great lengths to help me achieve my
goals. I am so grateful that you encouraged me to pursue my ambitions and supported me in
every possible way. I know that you wanted this for me as much as I wanted it for myself. Guess
what, Dad? I finally finished my “paper!”
To my sisters, Audra and Megan: Your friendship means the world to me. Thank you for
listening to my rants on the phone and lifting my spirits with laughter. Most of all, thank you for
believing in me when I did not believe in myself.
I want to express my appreciation to my brother-in-law, Sam, my mother and father-in
law, Tom and Bonnie, and my nephews, Luca and Asher. I felt loved and supported by all of you
as well.
To my husband, Loren: You are my lifeline. Thank you for loving me unconditionally
throughout this process, listening to me when I was voicing my frustrations and doubts, and

convincing me (many times) to keep going when I was ready to give up. I am forever grateful for
all of the sacrifices you made so that I could achieve this goal. Now, it’s your turn to chase your
dreams.
To my boys, Sebastian and Wyatt: Nothing makes me happier than being your mom.
Thank you for inspiring me to dream bigger and work harder. I love you, I love our little family,
and I can’t wait to see what adventures lie ahead of us!

TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Tables

iv

List of Figures

v

Abstract

vi

Chapter One: Introduction

1

Chapter Two: Literature Review
Definition of Insanity
History of the Insanity Defense
The Case of Ned Arnold
The Case of James Hadfield
The M’Naghten Rules
The Irresistible Impulse Rule
The Durham Rule
The American Law Institute (ALI) Rule
The Case of John Hinckley
The Aftermath (The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984)
History of the Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict
GBMI Procedure
Archival Research on the Impact of GBMI Statutes
Mock Juror Studies on the GBMI Verdict
Summary

8
8
8
10
11
11
13
14
15
16
17
19
22
25
30
33

Chapter Three: Methods
Participants
Materials
Insanity Case Vignette
Dispositional Consequence Information
Dependent Measures
Juror Knowledge Measure
Insanity Defense Attitudes Measure
Mental Illness Attitudes Measure
Perceived Dangerousness of the Defendant Measure
Demographic Questionnaire
Procedure
Research Questions
Hypotheses

35
35
37
37
38
38
38
39
40
41
41
41
42
43

i

Knowledge of Dispositional Consequences
Impact of Dispositional Consequences on Verdicts
Moderation Analyses

43
43
44

Chapter Four: Results
Overview
Sample
Juror Knowledge of Dispositional Consequences
Manipulation Check
Juror Knowledge in the Uninformed Condition
Juror Attitudes
Verdict Selection
Juror Attitudes and Verdicts
Multinomial Logistic Regression Models
Attitudes Toward the Insanity Defense
Attitudes Toward Mental Illness
Perceived Dangerousness of the Defendant
Summary

46
46
46
48
48
51
51
53
54
56
57
60
61
63

Chapter Five: Discussion
Knowledge of Dispositional Consequences
Informing Jurors of Dispositional Consequences
Attitudes Toward the Insanity Defense and Knowledge
Attitudes Toward Mental Illness and Knowledge
Perceived Dangerousness and Knowledge
Limitations
Practical Implications
Future Directions
Conclusion

64
65
67
68
70
71
72
73
74
76

References

77

Appendix A: Legal Criteria for Verdicts

88

Appendix B: Explanations of Dispositional Consequences

89

Appendix C: Insanity Case Vignette

90

Appendix D: Verdict Questionnaire

91

Appendix E: Perceived Dangerousness Questionnaire

92

Appendix F: Knowledge of Dispositional Consequences Questionnaire

93

Appendix G: Insanity Defense Attitudes Scale (IDA-R)

94

ii

Appendix H: Community Attitudes Toward Mental Illness Scale (CAMI)

96

Appendix I: Demographic Questionnaire

100

Appendix J: Base Model Table Including Demographics

102

Appendix K: Insanity Attitudes Table

103

Appendix L: Mental Illness Attitudes Table

104

Appendix M: Perceived Dangerousness Table

105

Appendix N: Figure 1

106

Appendix O: Figure 2

107

Appendix P: Approval Letter to Use IDA-R Scale

108

Appendix Q: Approval Letter to Use CAMI Scale

112

Appendix R: IRB Approval Letter

115

iii

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1:

Sample Demographics

47

Table 2:

Crosstabs for Juror Knowledge by Condition

49

Table 3:

Crosstabs for Condition by Verdict

54

Table 4:

Multinomial Logistic Regression for Verdict by Condition

57

Table 5:

Multinomial Logistic Regression for Verdict by Insanity Defense
Attitude, Condition, and Interaction between Insanity Defense
Attitude and Condition

59

Multinomial Logistic Regression for Verdict by Attitudes Toward
Mental Illness, Condition, and Interaction between Attitudes
Toward Mental Illness and Condition

61

Multinomial Logistic Regression for Verdict by Perceived
Dangerousness of Defendant, Condition, and Interaction between Perceived
Dangerousness of Defendant and Condition

62

Table 6:

Table 7:

Table 8:

Base Model Including Control Variables

102

Table 9:

Insanity Defense Attitudes Model Including Control Variables

103

Table 10:

Mental Illness Attitudes Model Including Control Variables

104

Table 11:

Perceived Dangerousness Model Including Control Variables

105

iv

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Estimated probabilities of selecting NGRI as a function of insanity
defense attitudes and dispositional consequence information condition

106

Figure 2: Estimated probabilities of selecting NGRI as a function of perceived
dangerousness of the defendant and dispositional consequence
information condition

107

v

ABSTRACT
In response to public opposition to the insanity defense, the Guilty But Mentally Ill (GBMI)
verdict was enacted with the intention of limiting the number of insanity acquittals and
alleviating the public’s concerns. Prior research suggests, however, that many jurors are making
verdict decisions with limited knowledge of the dispositional consequences of the GBMI and
NGRI verdicts. Further, jurors may erroneously assume that the GBMI verdict is a compromise
between a NGRI and guilty verdict, which mitigates punishment. In reality, the dispositional
consequences of a GBMI verdict are equivalent to or more restrictive than a guilty verdict. The
current study examined the impact of informing jurors of the dispositional consequences of the
GBMI and NGRI verdicts. In addition, it explores whether mock jurors’ attitudes toward the
insanity defense, individuals with mental illness, and perceptions of the defendant’s
dangerousness strengthens or attenuates the impact of informing mock jurors of dispositional
consequences. Participants (N = 488) read a case summary of an apparently mentally ill male
defendant charged with first-degree murder. Half of the participants were informed of the
dispositional consequences of GBMI and NGRI verdicts, while the other half of participants
received no such information. Then, they were asked to choose individual verdicts and complete
a questionnaire that assessed attitudes toward the insanity defense, attitudes toward individuals
with mental illness, and perceptions of the defendant’s dangerousness. Results indicate that
informing participants of dispositional consequences of the GBMI and NGRI verdicts increases
the likelihood that the NGRI verdict is selected over the GBMI verdict. In addition, participants

vi

who had more favorable attitudes toward the insanity defense and perceived the defendant as less
dangerous selected the NGRI verdict over the GBMI verdict at an even higher rate when they
were informed of dispositional consequences. The implications for educating jurors in trials that
include the GBMI verdict option are discussed.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION
The issue of criminal responsibility of mentally ill offenders has prompted debate among
scholars, lawmakers, and citizens for centuries. There is a long held belief that an individual who
commits a crime due to the influence of mental illness should not be held criminally responsible
for their actions. This moral principle is conveyed in the legal maxim, Actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea, which translates to “An act is not legally cognizable as evil, and hence criminally
punishable, unless it is committed by a person who has the capacity to cognize the act as evil and
then freely chooses to do it” (as cited in Golding & Roesch, 1987). With this principle in mind,
American law distinguishes between individuals who are held criminally responsible and those
found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI).
Despite the rationale for the insanity defense, the American public has historically opposed
its use within the criminal justice system (Briskin, & Rudolph, 1996; Cirincione, 1996). The
notion that a person could commit a crime and not be punished in the traditional sense is difficult
for many Americans to accept (Silver, Cirincione, & Steadman, 1994). In particular, the acquittal
of John Hinckley Jr. in the assassination attempt on President Reagan provoked public outrage
and opposition to the insanity defense (Callahan, Mayer, & Steadman, 1987). Public
misconceptions about the insanity defense have also contributed to negative attitudes regarding
its use (Borum & Fulero, 1999). One common fallacy, for instance, is that the insanity defense is
overused. However, empirical research has consistently shown that the defense is raised in less
than one percent of felony cases, with a “success” rate of approximately 25% (Perlin, 1996;
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Zapf, Golding, & Roesch, 2006). Another common misconception is that defendants found
NGRI are quickly released back into society. In reality, NGRI acquittees are typically committed
to psychiatric facilities immediately following their trial and are often held for longer lengths of
time than if they had been found guilty (Linhorst, 1997; Silver, 1995). In California, for instance,
defendants found NGRI of nonviolent crimes were confined for periods more than nine times as
long as defendants found guilty (Perlin, 1996; Steadman, Keitner, Braff, & Arvanites, 1983). In
addition, insanity acquittees are often subjected to a lifetime of post-release supervision (Perlin,
1996). Empirical research has consistently refuted insanity defense myths (Perlin, 1996); yet,
society remains unconvinced that the insanity defense is necessary in order to fairly adjudicate
mentally ill offenders.
In an effort to deal with the controversy of the insanity defense, 13 states enacted a new
verdict option, the “guilty but mentally ill” verdict (GBMI) (McGraw, Farthing-Capowich,
Keilitz, 1985). The primary motivation for the enactment of the GBMI verdict was to decrease
the number of insanity acquittals by offering an alternative to a NGRI verdict (Melville &
Naimark, 2002, Padavan, 1981). Mock jury research has consistently shown that the addition of
the GBMI option influences juror verdicts as intended (Criss & Racine, 1980; Roberts &
Golding, 1991; Roberts, Sargent & Chan, 1993). For example, Poulson, Wuensch, and Brondino
(1998) found a reduction of NGRI verdicts by approximately one half when a GBMI verdict
option was introduced. Guilty verdicts were also reduced by about two thirds.
Research reveals that many jurors are making verdict decisions with limited knowledge of
dispositional consequences of NGRI and GBMI verdicts. Sloat & Frierson (2005) investigated
jurors’ knowledge of mental illness verdicts and found that only 4.2% of highly educated jurors
could accurately identify the definitions and dispositional consequences of both NGRI and
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GBMI verdict options. Interestingly, 84% of jurors believed that dispositional consequence
information should be shared with jurors prior to deliberation. Among this subset of jurors, 71%
reported that knowledge of dispositional consequences would have some bearing on their verdict
decisions, regardless of judicial instructions to not consider the information when reaching a
verdict. Taking these findings into account, the current study explores the utility of informing
jurors of dispositional consequences. More specifically, this investigation poses the question:
Does informing jurors of GBMI and NGRI dispositional consequences impact verdict choices?
This investigation is essential because jurors may erroneously perceive the GBMI option is
an intermediate verdict between “guilty” and “NGRI” which, if chosen, will mitigate blame and
punishment of the defendant (Finkel, 1995, Finkel & Fulero, 1992, Poulson, Wuensch &
Brondino, 1998; Melville & Naimark, 2002). In truth, the enactment of the GBMI verdict has
drastically changed judicial procedure in ways that are detrimental to the mentally ill defendant.
Individuals found GBMI remain responsible for their actions and are subject to similar or more
stringent criminal sanctions than those who are found guilty, including longer prison sentences,
stricter parole terms and the death penalty (Callahan, McGreevy, & Cirincione, 1992; Sloat &
Frierson, 2005). In addition, GBMI defendants are often subject to additional punishments, such
as special limitations placed on their freedom within the correctional facility and stigmatization
by fellow inmates (Blunt & Stock, 1983).
Another glaring issue with the GBMI verdict option is that it does not guarantee defendants
are treated for their mental illness while incarcerated. In fact, some states have no requirements
for mental health treatment of the offender (Callahan et al, 1992, Dvoskin & Steadman, 1992.)
Other states, such as Michigan, cannot assure treatment due to lack of funds and overcrowding in
hospitals (Greene & Heilbrum, 2011). The chair of the Kentucky Parole Board filed an affidavit
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in 1991 summarizing the impact of the GBMI verdict stating that, “from psychological
evaluations and treatment summaries, the Board can detect no difference in the treatment or
outcomes for inmates who have been adjudicated as ‘Guilty But Mentally Ill,’ from those who
have been adjudicated as simply ‘guilty’” (Runda, 1991).
As suggested previously, research has shown that jurors consider dispositional
consequences when rendering a verdict, in spite of being instructed to disregard such information
(Sloat & Frierson, 2005). These findings, along with evidence of misinformed jurors (Sloat
&Frierson, 2005), provide strong justification for informing jurors of accurate dispositional
consequences in insanity cases. The United States Supreme Court ruled on this matter in
Shannon v. United States (1994) and held that federal district court judges generally should not
instruct the jury as to the consequences of a NGRI verdict. The rationale behind this ruling was
that informing the jury of dispositional consequences encourages it to consider matters outside
its realm and distracts it from its fact-finding responsibilities. The decision was not unanimous,
however, and in his strong dissenting opinion Justice Stevens stated, “[i]t would be far wiser for
the Court simply to recognize both the seriousness of the harm that may result from the refusal to
give the instruction and the absence of any identifiable countervailing harm that may result from
giving it,” (p. 591-592). Among the states, there is no consensus on the issue of whether jurors
should be informed of the consequences of a verdict in insanity cases. In rare circumstances,
state courts have ruled in favor jury instructions that include verdict consequences for NGRI and
GBMI verdicts. For example, Michigan courts held in People v. Cole (1969) that jury
instructions including the consequences of a NGRI verdict are necessary to prevent juror
confusion. In People v. Tenbrink (1979), the Michigan Court of Appeals acknowledged that
jurors are similarly uninformed as to the consequences of a GBMI verdict and held that
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consequences of a GBMI verdict should also be included in jury instructions. Yet, many state
courts do not instruct jurors on the consequences of NGRI and GBMI verdicts. In fact, the
dominant view among state courts is that informing jurors of verdict consequences in insanity
cases is “unnecessary and potentially confusing or distracting to criminal jurors” (Wheatman &
Shaffer, 2001, p. 169).
As discussed previously, scholars that oppose the GBMI verdict suggest that jurors are
being deceived when they are not informed of the outcomes of their verdict decisions (Melville
& Naimark, 2002, Palmer, 2000). This assertion is supported by research demonstrating that
informing jurors of accurate dispositional consequences shifts post-deliberation verdict
preferences in insanity cases. In a study by Wheatman and Shaffer (2001), mock jurors watched
a video of a murder case in which the defendant entered a plea of NGRI. Half of the participants
were informed of dispositional consequences of a NGRI verdict and half of the participants were
provided no such information. Jurors reported their individual verdict preferences and then
deliberated as members of a 6-person jury. Results showed that informing jurors of dispositional
consequences had little effect on individual jurors’ verdict preferences (see also Whittemore and
Ogloff, 1995). After deliberation, however, informed jurors tended to shift to a more lenient
verdict as compared to jurors who were not informed of dispositional consequences. Specifically,
60% of informed jurors chose a NGRI verdict, while 7% of uninformed jurors voted NGRI. The
authors suggest that deliberation may impact individual verdict preferences because it allows
jurors to discuss the legal implications of verdicts, which, in turn, leads to greater comprehension
of the relevant information that informs their verdict decisions.
To summarize, studies that have explored the impact of informing jurors of NGRI
dispositional consequences have produced notable findings. Specifically, they have revealed that

5

informing jurors of NGRI dispositional consequences significantly impacts jurors’ postdeliberation verdict preferences. In other words, when jurors are given accurate information
about the outcome of a NGRI verdict, they are more likely to choose a NGRI verdict when
compared to jurors that are not informed of dispositional consequences.
It is important to note that prior studies that explored the impact of informing mock jurors
of dispositional consequences focused solely on the NGRI verdict. In fact, there is no study to
date that has examined the impact of informing jurors of the dispositional consequences of the
GBMI verdict. This investigation intends to fill this gap in the research.
As previously noted, critics of the GBMI verdict have asserted that the verdict option is
deceptive to jurors because the verdict language (Guilty But Mentally Ill) implies that defendants
found GBMI will be treated for their mental illness. In reality, the GBMI verdict does not
guarantee mental health treatment for the defendant and, in fact, it involves more sanctions than
a simple ‘guilty’ verdict. Given that previous research suggests that jurors erroneously perceive
the GBMI verdict as an “intermediate” verdict (Finkel, 1995; Finkel & Fulero, 1992), the next
logical line of questioning involves whether informing mock jurors of accurate dispositional
consequences of a GBMI verdict will shift their verdict preferences. If jurors are choosing the
GBMI verdict option based on invalid assumptions about the dispositional consequences of the
verdict, this area of inquiry is necessary in order to protect the individuals who may otherwise be
found NGRI and guaranteed the psychiatric treatment they need and deserve. Additionally, in
light of the fact that research indicates that jurors’ attitudes influence their use of jury
instructions (Gordon, 2013), the present study examined mock jurors’ attitudes regarding the
insanity defense and individuals with mental illness and whether they moderate the relationship
between dispositional consequence knowledge and verdict choice. Lastly, this study explored
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whether perceptions of the defendant’s dangerousness moderate the relationship between
dispositional consequence knowledge and verdict choice.
This dissertation begins with a literature review of the history of the insanity defense and,
in particular, the GBMI statutes. The existing empirical research on juror decision-making in
GBMI cases is discussed. Finally, the methodology and results of a study on the impact of
informing jurors of GBMI and NGRI dispositional consequences in insanity cases will be
presented and discussed.
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CHAPTER TWO:
LITERATURE REVIEW
Definition of insanity
Criminal responsibility involves two essential elements: a guilty act (actus reus) and a
guilty mind (mens rea) (Slovenko, 2009). A fundamental principle of our criminal law,
embodied in the common law requirement of mens rea, is that it is unjust to subject an individual
to criminal punishment unless a guilty mind accompanied the guilty act.
In light of this notion, the insanity defense ensures that those individuals who did not
demonstrate mens rea can be found legally insane or “not guilty by reason of insanity” (NGRI)
and, therefore, are not held criminally responsible for the guilty act.
A vital distinction to make is that an individual with a diagnosed mental illness would not
necessarily be considered legally insane (Williams, 2003). This is because the defendant is
required to meet the criteria of insanity defined by law (Williams, 2003). In other words, insanity
is a legal standard, whereas mental illness is a psychological diagnosis (Williams, 2003).
History of the Insanity Defense
The belief that the "insane" deserve mercy rather than punishment reflects long- standing
social, religious, and moral values that can be as far back as the earliest recordings of Hebrew
law (Maeder, 1985; Zapf, Golding, and Roesch, 2006). The Talmud, a second century written
compilation of Jewish law, states the following:
It is an ill thing to knock against a deaf mute, an imbecile, or a minor. He that wounds
them is culpable, but if they wound others they are not culpable… for with them only the
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act is a consequence while the intention is of no consequence.
Ancient Greek and Roman law distinguished between the notions of culpa (negligence)
and dolus (intentional fraud) (Zapf, Golding, and Roesch, 2006). Children under the age of seven
were regarded doli incapax, meaning, “not possessed of sufficient discretion and intelligence to
distinguish between right and wrong” (Black, 1979 as cited in Zapf, Golding, and Roesch, 2006).
Further, children were considered “incapable of criminal intention or malice” (Black, 1979 as
cited in Zapf, Golding, and Roesch, 2006). These earliest examples of variation in criminal
responsibility were the foundation for the insanity laws of future societies.
In the thirteenth century, the definition of insanity continued to evolve. Bracton, the
leading jurist of the time, wrote a treatise titled On the Laws and Customs of England (1915). In
his thesis, which would later influence Judge Tracy’s “wild beast” instructions, he suggested that
a person who was non compos mentis (no power or possession of mind) was completely lacking
in good judgment (Robinson, 1980; Simon & Aaronson, 1988). Bracton described insane
individuals as “not very different from animals who lack understanding, and no transaction is
valid that is entered into them while their madness lasts.” (Walker, 1968, p.28) Bracton’s
writings also introduced the concept of temporary insanity, a condition that he labeled “lunacy,”
(Hale, 1847; Robinson, 1980).
During the fourteenth century, England progressively developed a separate system of
criminal law that included criminal defenses. Initially, insanity did not preclude a conviction;
rather, the offender avoided execution through a pardon granted by the King (Bonnie, Jeffries, &
Low, 1986). Following the recognition of insanity as a legitimate legal defense, the first
documented case of an individual being acquitted occurred in 1505 (Bonnie, Jeffries, & Low;
1986; Simon & Aaronson, 1988).
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English common law continued to give emphasis to the notion that the insane should not
be held responsible for their crimes because they did not have guilty or evil minds. Jurist Lord
Hale significantly impacted modern day conceptions of criminal responsibility and insanity. He
attempted to categorize insanity into three categories: (1) idiocy; (2) dementia accidentalis vel
adventitia; (3) dementia affectata, or drunkenness. He divided the second class into two groups:
perfect insanity and partial insanity. While Hale recognized that an individual could be partially
impaired, he did not consider it a legitimate defense (Finkel, 1988). He also expanded on
Bracton’s notion of temporary insanity and suggested that individuals claiming insanity must
only prove they were insane at the time they committed the offense, not at the present time
(Finkel, 1988).
The Case of Ned Arnold
In the 18th century, the “wild beast” standards for acquitting mentally ill offenders were
developed by Judge Tracy in the case of Rex v. Arnold. “Mad Ned Arnold” was found guilty of
shooting Lord Onslow in spite of significant evidence indicating his insanity. Family members
and servants testified that Arnold believed that Lord Onslow was “bewitching him with devils
and imps” (Finkel, 1988, p.12). The prosecution argued that Arnold proved he had mens rea
when he bought the powder for his gun and fired the shot. Rex v. Arnold is historically
noteworthy because of Judge Tracy’s revised insanity standard which states, “In order to avail
himself of the defense of insanity, a man must be totally deprived of his understanding and
memory so as not to know what he is doing, no more than an infant, brute, or a wild beast” (Rex
v. Arnold, 1724, pp. 764-765). Judge Tracy’s instructions to the jury signify a shift toward more
skepticism regarding insanity and a formulation that restricts the kind of mental states that
qualify as legal insanity (Erickson & Erickson, 2008). Also significant, the prosecution objected
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to presenting evidence of behavior prior to the crime, which was overruled by Judge Tracy. This
decision opened the door for expert witness testimony based on evaluations performed on the
defendant after the crime was committed (Finkel, 1988).
The Case of James Hadfield
The wild beast standard was the rule of law in England for over one hundred years, until
its merit was called into question during the case of James Hadfield in 1800. Hadfield was
indicted for high treason for attempting to shoot King George III. He suffered from the delusion
that Christ’s second coming was soon approaching. However, Hadfield believed that he had to
die in order to precipitate the Savior’s return. He fired a shot at King George III, in hopes of
being executed. Well-known jurist Thomas Erskine argued in defense of Hadfield that the notion
of total insanity required by the wild beast test was flawed. He suggested that the true definition
of madness was “delusion without frenzy and raving madness” (Halttunen, 1998, p. 215).
Hadfield was acquitted and detained in Bethlem Hospital for the remainder of his life. Although
Hadfield’s case did not immediately influence mens rea doctrine, it paved the way for a broader
definition of insanity (Halttunen, 1998). It suggested a progressive conception of insanity, one
that focuses on insanity as a mental illness that can be diagnosed by mental health professionals
(Erickson & Erickson, 1998). The acquittal also led to the passage of the Criminal Lunatics Act
of 1800, which created a process whereby the court could require insanity acquitees to be
detained for the rest of their lives (Walker, 1968).
The M’Naghten Rules
One of the most widely discussed cases relating to the insanity defense is the case Daniel
M’Naghten (Regina v. M’Naghten, 1843). M’Naghten was a woodworker from Glasgow,
Scotland who attempted to assassinate Sir Robert Peel, the Prime Minister of Britain. However,
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M’Naghten misidentified the prime minister and shot and killed his private secretary, Edward
Drummond, instead (Moran, 1985). During the trial, the testimony of nine medical experts
portrayed M’Naghten as a seemingly paranoid schizophrenic “entangled in an elaborate system
of delusions,” who believed the prime minister was to blame for his hardship (Simon &
Aaronson, 1988, p. 12). The jury found M’Naghten not guilty due to his insanity and he was
confined to Bethlem and, soon after, Broadmoor Mental Institution (Simon & Aaronson, 1988).
The M’Naghten decision incited strong disapproval from Queen Victoria, the English
House of Lords and the citizens, who perceived the acquittal as a disregard for public safety
(Moran, 1985). In response, the House of Lords summoned 15 judges in Great Britain to defend
the standard for criminal responsibility applied in the M’Naghten case (Simon & Aaronson,
1988). This discussion led to a consensus among 14 of the judges regarding a legal definition of
insanity. The judges’ responses ignored the more recent progress in understanding mental illness
that was demonstrated in the Hadfield and M’Naghten cases (Simon & Aaronson, 1988). Instead,
the judges decided on a narrow standard of insanity and, in 1851, the standard was implemented
in federal and most of the state courts (Simon & Aaronson, 1988). The M’Naghten rules state as
follows:
[E]very man is to be presumed to be sane . . . . [T]o establish a defense on the ground of
insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party
accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not
know he was doing something wrong (Regina v. M’Naghten, 1843, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 203, 8
Eng. at 723, cited by Moran, 1985, p.40).
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The M’Naghten standard is composed of three significant elements. First, it must be
determined that the defendant is experiencing “a defect of reason, from disease of the mind.” In
modern terms, this describes an individual suffering from mental illness. Second, it must be
proven that the defendant’s mental illness prevented him from understanding “the nature and
quality of the act he was doing.” Third, it must be determined whether the defendant knew
“what he was doing was wrong.” In other words, a defendant may be acquitted if he understands
the act, but does not have the capacity to understand the act was wrong (Ogloff, 1990). Because
the second and third elements focus on the defendant’s thought processes, the M’Naghten
standard is considered a cognitive test of insanity (Ogloff & Schuller, 2001).
The Irresistible Impulse Rule
By 1887, the M’Naghten rule began to receive criticism for solely focusing on cognitive
impairment and ignoring affective and impulsive behavior that mental health professionals
considered important (Erickson & Erickson, 1998). It was argued that mental illness could take
away the “power to choose as well as the knowledge…of right and wrong” (Robinson & Cahill,
2012). Due to growing dissatisfaction the M’Naghten rule, some jurisdictions added the
“irresistible impulse” rule to the M’Naghten rule in hopes of broadening the standard for
insanity. This supplemental test allows the defendant meet the standard if he satisfies the
M’Naghten rule or:
(i) if by reason of the duress of such mental disease, he had so far lost the power
to choose between right and wrong, and to avoid doing the act in question, as that his free
agency was at the time destroyed; (ii) and if, at the same time, the alleged crime was so
connected with such mental disease, in relation of cause and effect, as to have been the
product of it solely (Parsons v. State, 1887).
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The M’Naghten-plus-irresistible-impulse rule was criticized as continuing to be too
narrow in light of recent advances in psychiatry. In spite of the flaws, 18 states and the federal
system adopted irresistible impulse test to broaden the M'Naghten rule by the beginning of the
20th Century.
The Durham Rule
Judge Bazelon, writing his opinion for the U.S. Court of Appeals on the case Durham v.
United States (1954), observed that the McNaghten-plus-irresistible-impulse test was focused on
specific symptoms rather than the crucial question of whether the presence of mental illness
caused the offense (Robinson, 2012). In an effort to establish a broader test, the court stated, “an
accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of a mental disease or
defect” (Durham v. United States, 1954). Further, the Court clarified the jury’s role in insanity
cases:
Juries will continue to make moral judgments, still operating under the fundamental
precept that ‘Our collective conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot
impose blame.’ But in making such judgments, they will be guided by wider horizons of
knowledge concerning mental life. The question will be simply whether the accused
acted because of a mental disorder, and not whether he displayed particular symptoms
which medical science has long recognized do not necessarily, or even typically,
accompany even the most serious mental disorder. (p.876)
The intent of the Durham rule was “to move the mentally ill from the criminal justice
system to the mental health system” (Erickson & Erickson, p. 94). The rule received a positive
response from mental health professionals, many of who believed it would revolutionize the
process of determining criminal responsibility of mentally ill offenders (Wickware, 1983).
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Nevertheless, it was widely criticized for leaving the jury without sufficient guidance. The
Durham rule’s ambiguity was also seen as granting excessive authority to mental health
professionals (Levesque, 2006). Without a more elaborate definition of mental disease or defect,
the jury had no choice but to depend solely on expert testimony to establish whether the act was
a result of mental illness (Levesque, 2006). In an effort to reduce expert reliance, the courts ruled
that mental health professionals could not testify about the connection between the mental
disease and the criminal behavior (Washington v. United States, 1967). Attempts at revision
were futile and, eighteen years later, in United States v. Brawner (1972), the federal court
abandoned the Durham rule and adopted the American Law Institute standard.
The American Law Institute (ALI) Rule
In 1953, a group of judges, lawyers and medical professionals known as the American
Law Institute (ALI) convened to consider alternative insanity standards (Simon & Aaronson,
1988). The result of this collaboration was the development of the Model Penal Code insanity
defense provision (ALI, 1962). The ALI rule was meant to be a compromise between what was
perceived as an overly restrictive M’Naghten rule and an ambiguous Durham rule.
The Model Penal Code (1962) states:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a
result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law.
(2) As used in this article, the terms “mental disease or defect” do not include an
abnormality manifested only be repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.
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The ALI was significant because it recognized that both cognitive and volitional elements
are relevant when considering a defendant’s criminal responsibility. The new standard was
viewed as significant progress and, by 1985, was adopted in approximately half of the states and
all federal jurisdictions (Keilitz & Fulton, 1983; Slovenko, 1995).
The Case of John Hinckley
On March 30, 1981, John W. Hinckley, Jr. fired six shots at President Ronald Reagan as
he exited a Washington Hotel. The shot did not hit Reagan directly, but seriously wounded him
when it ricocheted off the side of a limousine and hit him in the chest. In addition to the attack on
the President, Hinckley also shot a police officer, a Secret Service agent, and the press secretary,
James Brady. Hinckley was arrested at the scene (Ewing & McCann, 2006).
Hinckley’s trial began on May 4, 1982 and his attorneys entered a plea of not guilty by
reason of insanity. During the seven-week trial, the defense attorneys claimed that Hinckley had
not made a rational choice to attempt to assassinate the President; rather, his life was controlled
by his obsession with the movie, Taxi Driver and the starring actress, Jodie Foster. The defense
also argued that Hinckley was schizophrenic, and he suffered from a delusion that he could gain
Foster’s love and respect if he became famous for assassinating the president (Ewing & McCann,
2006; Erickson & Erickson, 2008).
At the time of the Hinckley trial, the ALI rule was the insanity standard in the District of
Columbia. The phrase “lacks substantial capacity… to appreciate the criminality of conduct” was
closely scrutinized in the trial. The defense asserted that “appreciate” should include cognitive
and emotional understanding of the consequences of the act (Erickson & Erickson, 2008). It was
argued that Hinckley was lacking emotional understanding of his assassination attempt. Medical
experts supported this assertion by presented Hinckley’s writings, including a letter to Foster,
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which portrayed a man who was completely lacking the mental capacity to understand the
wrongfulness of his actions (Erickson & Erickson, 2008). Medical experts also introduced a
CAT scan of Hinckley's brain that showed he had widened sulci (grooves in the brain), one of
the common symptoms of chronic schizophrenia (Ewing & McCann, 2006). Conversely, the
prosecution called expert witnesses to testify that Hinckley understood what he was doing during
the assassination attempt and, as a result, was considered legally sane (Erickson & Erickson,
2008). After three days of deliberation, the jury rendered a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity on all charges related to Hinckley’s attempted assassination of President Reagan. He
was sent to St. Elizabeth’s Mental Hospital in Washington, D.C. (Ewing & McCann, 2006). In
July 2016, Hinckley’s doctors at St. Elizabeth’s Mental Hospital agreed he had recovered from
his mental illness and granted him “full-time convalescent leave” from the hospital. He currently
lives in Williamsburg, Virginia with his mother.
The Aftermath (The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984)
John Hinckley’s acquittal evoked an enormous amount of public outrage. Regardless of
Hinckley’s apparent mental illness, the majority of the public was seeking retribution for the man
that shot the President, Press Secretary James Brady and two others (Hans & Slater, 1983). A
poll conducted after Hinckley’s acquittal revealed that the majority of the Americans surveyed
felt "justice had not been done" in the trial (Hans & Slater, 1983; ABC News, 1982). Strongest
disapproval revolved around the fact that the evidence indicated that Hinckley was aware of what
he was doing when he attempted to kill the President.
The controversial verdict once more raised questions about the necessity of the insanity
defense. In an effort to more clearly understand the reasons for the Hinckley acquittal, the United
States Senate took unprecedented action and summoned jurors to testify before a subcommittee.
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A number of professional associations also convened to make recommendations regarding the
insanity defense. The American Medical Association recommended the abolition of the insanity
defense. The National Mental Health Association, the American Psychiatric Association, and the
American Bar Association, however, advised retaining the insanity defense (Erickson &
Erickson, 2008).
In 1984, following two years of consideration, Congress passed the Insanity Defense
Reform Act (IDRA). The IDRA rule reads:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any federal statute that, at the time of the
commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant as a result of a severe mental
disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his
acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.
The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing
evidence. (Insanity Defense, 18 U.S.C. § 17 [2006])
The legislation changed the former approach by replacing "unable to appreciate" with
"lacks substantial capacity" to indicate that “insanity” requires total mental impairment (Erickson
& Erickson, 2008). The IDRA rule also eliminated the volitional (irresistible impulse) aspect of
the defense. This resulted in a rule that essentially looks like the M’Naghten rule, with its
emphasis on the defendant’s cognitions for determining insanity (Perlin, 1989). In addition, the
IDRA rule shifted the burden of proof to the defense. In other words, the prosecution no longer
has to prove that the defendant was sane at the time of the act. Rather, the defense must prove
that the defendant is insane.
Even prior to the Hinckley verdict, public concern regarding the insanity defense
convinced legislatures in Montana and Idaho to abolish the insanity defense (Fentiman, 1985).
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The intensified public backlash in response to Hinckley verdict led to additional state reforms. In
fact, thirty-four states specified more stringent limitations on the use of the insanity defense
between 1982 and 1985 (Erickson & Erickson, 2008). Specifically, twenty-seven states (Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana,
Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, Ohio,
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia,
and Wyoming) narrowed the test of insanity; seven states shifted the burden of proof to the
defendant and one state, Utah, abolished the defense completely (Erickson & Erickson, 2008;
Low, Jeffries, & Bonnie, 1986). The most frequent policy change, however, was to supplement
the controversial NGRI verdict with an additional verdict option of “guilty but mentally ill”
(GBMI) (Slobogin, 1985; Low, Jeffries, & Bonnie, 1986; Rogers, 1987). The following sections
will discuss the history of the GBMI verdict and GBMI verdict procedure.
History of the Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict
The establishment of the Guilty but Mentally Ill (GBMI) verdict is one of the most
significant developments in insanity defense law history. Although the Hinckley trial provoked
many states to enact the GBMI verdict, the initial steps toward establishing the new verdict
occurred earlier. In 1966, a special commission was assembled in Michigan in response to
increased awareness of the mistreatment and neglect occurring in the mental health system and a
hope of protecting the civil rights of offenders diagnosed with mental illness (Blunt & Stock,
1985). Due to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dusky v. United States (1960), which affirmed a
defendant’s right to competency evaluation, one of the commission’s objectives was to define the
criteria for competency to stand trial. In addition, the commission was responsible for revising
the conditions of release for NGRI patients (Blunt & Stock, 1985). Following the committee’s
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law revisions, many individuals who were found incompetent to stand trial were returned to
court and, consequently, dockets became inundated with cases involving mentally ill defendants.
As a result, NGRI verdicts dramatically increased from 12 in 1967 to a total of 203 by 1973
(Blunt & Stock, 1985).
Perhaps the most influential event in the evolution of the GBMI verdict was the Michigan
Supreme Court’s decision People v. McQuillan (1974). With the intention of protecting due
process and equal protection rights, the Court ruled that an indefinite commitment period for
NGRI acquittees was unconstitutional because it entailed different release procedures from those
available to individuals who were civilly committed. In the spirit of fairness, the Court abolished
Michigan’s automatic commitment law and specified that only a 60-day mandatory diagnostic
evaluation was considered constitutional for NGRI acquittees (Smith & Hall, 1982; Blunt &
Stock, 1985). In order to be committed for a longer term, the acquittee had to meet several
criteria, including a diagnosis of a mental illness. The acquittee also had to demonstrate that
he/she: "(a) as a result of that mental illness can reasonably be expected within the near future to
intentionally or unintentionally seriously physically injure himself or another person, and who
has engaged in an act or acts or made significant threats that are substantially supportive of the
expectation", or "(b) a person who is mentally ill and who as a result of that mental illness is
unable to attend to those of his basic physical needs such as food, clothing, or shelter that must
be attended to in order for him to avoid serious harm in the near future and who has
demonstrated that inability by failing to attend to those basic physical needs.” (Michigan
Compiled Laws as cited in Blunt & Stock, 1985, p. 52) Further, the Court ruled that all
committed NGRI acquittees be reevaluated and discharged if they no longer met criteria for civil
commitment (Sloat, 2005). The Michigan Supreme Court’s decision in People v. McQuillan
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(1974) led to the evaluation of 270 NGRI acquittees, 214 (79%) of who were released (Blunt &
Stock, 1985). Soon after their release, two acquittees committed brutal offenses. Ronald Manlen
raped two women and John Mcgee beat his wife to death (Slovenko, 2009).
The American public was outraged and, in response, the Michigan legislature quickly
enacted the GBMI statute (Slovenko, 2009). Michigan remained the only state with a GBMI law
until 1981 when a highly publicized case in Indiana provoked public outcry over the insanity
defense once again (Kinsey, 1982). Steven Judy was accused of murdering a woman and her
three children. He pled NGRI and, although he was ultimately found guilty and sentenced to
death, many were offended that a NGRI verdict was even considered. Soon after he was
convicted, Indiana passed a GBMI statute in hopes of restricting the use of the insanity defense.
The controversial case of People v. Vanda in Illinois instigated the third GBMI state law.
Thomas Vanda, while on probation from a murder conviction, killed a 15-year-old girl with a
hunting knife. He successfully pled NGRI to the second murder and was institutionalized for 15
months. Upon release, Vanda offended yet again, stabbing another woman to death. The Illinois
legislature promptly followed Michigan and Indiana’s lead and enacted a GBMI statute (Gardner
& Anderson, 2014; Klofas & Weishelt, 1987).
Public distrust of the insanity defense continued to intensify and, soon after the Hinckley
verdict, 8 additional states adopted a GBMI statute: Alaska (1982), Delaware (1982), Georgia
(1982), Kentucky (1982), New Mexico (1982), Pennsylvania (1982), South Dakota (1983), Utah
(1983), and South Carolina (1984) (Linhorst & Dirks-Linhorst, 1999; Landis 2000). In 1995,
Nevada abolished the insanity defense and replaced it with a GBMI verdict option. When the
Nevada Supreme Court overturned the ruling in 2001, the insanity defense was reinstated and the
GBMI verdict option was retained (Finger v. State, 2001).
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GBMI Procedure
In states that enacted a GBMI statute, the alternative verdict option is available whenever a
defendant pleas NGRI (Slovenko, 1995). Once the plea is entered, the jury is informed of the
four verdict options: guilty, not guilty, not guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty but mentally ill.
The GBMI statute (MICH. COMP. LAWS § 768.36, 1976) provides:
If the defendant asserts a defense of insanity… the defendant may be found "guilty but
mentally ill" if, after trial, the trier of fact finds all of the following beyond a reasonable
doubt:
(a) That the defendant is guilty of an offense
(b) That the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the commission of that
offense.
(c) That the defendant was not legally insane at the time of the commission of that
offense.
The jurors in states with a GBMI verdict option are responsible for making a distinction
between two very similar terms: “mentally ill” and “legally insane.” Some states supply jurors
with statutory definitions. In Alaska, for instance, the definition of “insanity” is as follows:
“When the defendant engaged in the criminal conduct, the defendant was unable, as a result of a
mental disease or defect, to appreciate the nature and quality of that conduct” (Alaska Statute
§12.47.010, date). While the following definition for GBMI is provided: “[T]he defendant
lacked, as a result of a mental disease or defect, the substantial capacity either to appreciate the
wrongfulness of that conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law” (Alaska
Statute § 12.47.030, date). Critics have expressed concerns that providing definitions for the
terms “mentally ill” and “legally insane” only offers minimal guidance to the jurors, since the
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concepts are so closely related and making distinctions may be difficult (Callahan et al., 1992;
Melville & Naimark, 2002; Slobogin, 1985). In fact, to the layperson, the terms may be
indistinguishable (Fentiman, 1985; Melville & Naimark, 2002). Most states, however, do not
provide a detailed definition of GBMI; rather, jurors are simply informed that a GBMI defendant
is “not insane but...suffering from a mental illness” (Illinois Compiled Statute as cited in
Melville & Naimark, 2002). Jurors are expected to interpret GBMI independently and choose the
verdict that they deem appropriate.
In essence, the GBMI verdict allows jurors to find “the defendant is mentally ill, yet holds
him criminally responsible” (Nesson, 1982 as cited in Slovenko, 1995, p. 172). A GBMI verdict
does not mitigate the consequences of a conviction; therefore, a defendant found GBMI is
subjected to the same sanctions that he or she would have been if found guilty (Petrella,
Benedek, Bank & Packer, 1985; Sloat & Frierson, 2005). In other words, a GBMI verdict is
another “guilty” verdict because the outcome is the same. In fact, in at least four cases, the
sentence has been the death penalty (Slovenko, 1995). Slovenko (2009) asserts that jurors think
GBMI is a “middle ground” verdict because “guilty but mentally ill” sounds exculpatory (p.
212). Indeed, jurors must rely on their own assumptions because most jurisdictions do not inform
jurors of the GBMI or NGRI verdict consequences (Rogers & Shuman, 2000).
Proponents of the GBMI legislation contend that the alternative verdict offers jurors an
option that assures the defendant serves a minimum term before release, while acknowledging
that the offender is in need of psychiatric treatment (Zapf , Golding, & Roesch, 2006). Critics,
however, insist that the GBMI is a guilty verdict hidden behind clever language, which is
intended “to circumvent the McQuillan decision by eliminating the release of persons after they
are acquitted by reason of insanity” (Serwer, 1976, Blunt & Stock, 1985, p.). Others labeled the
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GBMI verdict as “disingenuous” and an alternative that “hoodwinks the jury in a decisional
process and…hoodwinks the public” (Slovenko, 1982, p. 545). In regard to the impact of the
GBMI verdict on juror decision-making, the American Psychiatric Association (1983) has
labeled GBMI as a “compromise verdict” that allows juries “to avoid grappling with difficult
issues of guilt and innocence by giving them an easy way out.” Similarly, scholars point out that
jurors may use GBMI as a compromise verdict when they want to ensure incarceration despite
the fact that the defendant meets criteria for legal insanity (Callahan et al., 1992). The American
Bar Association and the National Mental Health Association have also expressed their opposition
to the verdict (Borum & Fulero, 1999).
While all of these concerns are significant, the lack of treatment for defendants found
GBMI, which is implied in the verdict language, is highlighted as the most serious flaw of the
legislation (Perlin, 1996; Slobogin, 1985; Steadman, 1993). Research clearly indicates that
special treatment for GBMI inmates is rare and, when available, is identical to the treatment
offered to the general population (Callahan et al., 1992; Keilitz, 1987; Linhorst & Dirk-Linhorst,
1999; Smith & Hall, 1982). The National Mental Health Association’s (1983, p. xxx) position is
that: “(The GBMI) verdict does not insure in any way that persons found guilty under it, as
opposed to persons found simply guilty, will be treated any differently when a trial is over.”
Further, a GBMI inmate may be restricted from participating in supplemental prison programs,
such as work farms, due to their “mentally ill” status (Blunt & Stock, 1985). A GBMI verdict,
therefore, is a clear disadvantage to the offenders because they are subject to additional
constraints within the justice system. Alaska, in particular, goes as far as exempting GBMI
offenders from probation or parole (Blunt & Stock, 1985).
Roughly one hundred state appellate court decisions have addressed issues raised regarding

24

the GBMI verdict (Slovenko, 1995). GBMI statutes are generally appealed based on two
concerns: (a) the denial of due process and equal protection under the Constitution and (2) the
denial of right to treatment (Slovenko, 1995). For example, in State v. Hornsby (1997) the
appellant argued that since jurors are not informed of the verdict consequences that exist
following a GBMI verdict, they are misled to believe GBMI is a “lesser verdict than guilty.” The
appellant claimed that the GBMI statute violated his due process rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the argument “speculative”
and ruled that the GBMI verdict was constitutional on due process grounds (State v. Hornsby,
1997; LeBlanc-Allman, 1998; Linhorst & Dirk-Linhorst, 1999). Regarding the right to treatment,
the Illinois Appellate Court held that there is no constitutional right to treatment for defendants
found GBMI because they have not been involuntarily committed (People v. Marshall; Callahan,
McGreevy, Cirincione, and Steadman, 1992). The Court clarified its position by stating:
"Persons found guilty but mentally ill...are incarcerated for their crimes, not their mental
condition" (People v. Marshall, 1983). Regardless of the grounds for opposition, courts have
consistently upheld the constitutionality of the GBMI statutes. Currently, 12 states have a GBMI
verdict option available to jurors in insanity cases.
The following sections will review the existing research on the impact of the GBMI verdict
on insanity case verdicts. The first section will discuss archival research, and the following
section will focus specifically on the extant mock juror research.
Archival Research on the Impact of GBMI Statutes
Empirical studies on the impact of GBMI reforms have demonstrated that the introduction
of the alternative verdict has only had subtle effects on insanity case verdicts (Appelbaum, 1994;
Borum & Fulero, 1999, La Fond & Duram, 1992; Palmer & Hazelrigg, 2000). The research
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from Michigan and Illinois, in particular, indicated that the enactment of the GBMI statute had
little or no influence (Keilitz, 1987; McGraw, Farthing-Capowich, & Keilitz, 1985, Smith &
Hall, 1982). Smith & Hall (1982) conducted the first study of the impact of the GBMI legislation
on NGRI verdicts. The authors focused on criminal defendants who were adjudicated in
Michigan between 1975 and 1981. Results showed that NGRI verdicts were not significantly
impacted by the enactment of the GBMI statute (Smith & Hall, 1982). Prior to the GBMI statute,
0.024 percent of male defendants were found NGRI. Seven years after the introduction of the
GBMI verdict, 0.032 percent of male defendants were found NGRI (Slovenko, 1995; Smith &
Hall, 1982). Smith and Hall (1982) claim that defendant’s found GBMI would likely have been
found guilty if the GBMI verdict was not available. The authors make this assertion based on the
fact that GBMI inmates were found to be more similar demographically to the individuals found
guilty than those found NGRI. Similarities between GBMI and guilty inmates were noted on the
following demographic variables: less education and unemployment, more substance abuse, a
higher number of past criminal charges, and fewer psychiatric hospitalizations (Smith & Hall,
1982). However, as Petrella & colleagues (1985) point out, the GBMI verdict was enacted at the
same time that the insanity criteria in Michigan were modified from M’Naughten to ALI. The
broader criteria for insanity, in conjunction with the more stringent criteria for commitment,
could predictably have led to an increase in NGRI verdicts. Therefore, the introduction of the
GBMI alternative may be at least partially responsible for the lack of change in the percentage of
successful insanity acquittals (Petrella, Benedek, Bank & Packer, 1985).
In an effort to explore the questions raised by Smith & Hall more thoroughly, Keilitz
(1987) examined data on defendants pleading NGRI from Michigan, Illinois, and Georgia. The
author found that GBMI defendants were similar to NGRI defendants on some variables and
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guilty defendants on others. Although the impact on verdicts was minimal, Keilitz (1987) did
find that GBMI defendants received longer sentences than guilty defendants.
Klofas and Weisheit (1987) analyzed court data from Illinois and concluded NGRI verdicts
had not decreased after the GBMI statute was enacted. They also noted that GBMI inmates were
rarely offered treatment. Based on a survey of prosecutors, the authors also discovered that
offenders might use the GBMI verdict as a way to minimize their “sense of responsibility” for
their crime (Klofas & Weisheit, 1987; p.?).
On the other hand, studies that analyzed data from Georgia and Pennsylvania found that
GBMI reforms decreased the likelihood of NGRI verdicts (Callahan et al., 1992; Keilitz, 1987;
Mckay & Kopelman, 1988). MacKay and Kopelman (1988) analyzed the effects of the GBMI
statute in Pennsylvania from 1982 to 1987. The average number of NGRI verdicts was
significantly reduced after the GBMI statute was enacted; however, the authors note that a shift
in the burden of proof to the defense may have decreased the number of insanity pleas.
Interestingly, defendants found GBMI were more likely to have been convicted of murder, while
defendants found NGRI were more likely to have committed assault. This supports the theory of
a “compromise” verdict when jurors want to ensure the defendant does not become a threat to the
community after release from a psychiatric facility.
Prior studies on the impact of GBMI statutes have been criticized for focusing solely on the
differences in the number of NGRI and GBMI verdicts (Keilitz, 1982). With the intention of
improving on previous research, Callahan and colleagues (1992) examined the characteristics of
defendants pleading NGRI pre and post enactment of the GBMI verdict in Georgia, while
controlling for variables such as demographics, offense type and psychiatric diagnoses. In
contrast to earlier studies, analyses revealed that the introduction of the GBMI verdict decreased
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the likelihood of a NGRI verdict. Results also indicated that the decrease in insanity acquittals
was most significant among violent offenders. Contradictory to previous research, the authors
assert that some GBMI defendants would have otherwise been found NGRI, since the rate of
NGRI verdicts significantly decreased after the introduction of the GBMI verdict. Further, the
distribution of verdicts revealed “a decline in the proportion found guilty and NGRI…suggesting
that those found GBMI were pulled for both groups” (Callahan et al., 1992, p. 460). Similar to
the study by Keilitz (1987), data revealed that defendants found GBMI were more likely to be
incarcerated and more likely to receive a life sentence. More specifically, 70.6% of defendants
found GBMI of murder as compared to 49.2% of defendants found guilty of murder were
sentenced to life in prison. GBMI defendants also received longer sentences than guilty
defendants. In murder cases, for instance, the sentence for a GBMI defendant was approximately
5 years longer than the sentence of a guilty defendant. Therefore, GBMI defendants appear to
have substantial disadvantage in terms of the sanctions imposed post-conviction when compared
to their guilty counterparts (Callahan et al., 1992).
Slovenko (2009) suggests that the availability of the GBMI is a disadvantage to defendants,
in general, because NGRI pleas are less likely to be entered due to the GBMI verdict option. The
author asserts that when a GBMI option is available, attorneys prefer to enter a not guilty plea as
opposed to a NGRI plea. This strategy is intended to avoid offering the jury two “guilty” options
(guilty and GBMI) when a NGRI plea is entered (Slovenko, 2009).
Steadman et al. (1993) conducted a review of studies on the impact of the GBMI verdict on
insanity cases in Michigan, Illinois, Georgia, and Pennsylvania. Contrary to Slovenko’s (2009)
claim, the authors concluded that the passage of the GBMI alternative did not reduce insanity
pleas. NGRI verdicts decreased, but this decline began before the enactment of the GBMI
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verdict. Although the overall intended effects of the GBMI verdict were not demonstrated, some
impact was noted in cases that involve more serious crimes (Steadman, 1993). Prior to the
introduction of the GBMI verdict, 20 percent of NGRI pleas in murder cases were successful.
After the introduction of the GBMI verdict, NGRI verdicts decreased to 7 percent, while 25
percent of verdicts in insanity cases were GBMI (Steadman, 1993).
Slovenko (1995) cites an unpublished Purdue University study that investigated the effects
of the enactment of GBMI statutes. Results indicated that the introduction of the GBMI verdict
increased the probability that defendants who would have otherwise been found “not guilty” (i.e.,
acquitted) were found GBMI (i.e., convicted). The authors hypothesize that, although there is not
enough evidence to convict, jurors may have serious concerns about the defendant’s mental
health and the potential risk for future dangerous behavior. Jurors may choose the GBMI verdict
because they believe it ensures treatment for the defendant and, in turn, offers security to the
community. Although this finding has not been replicated in archival research, mock jury
research has produced similar results. This body of research will be presented in detail in the
following section.
In sum, the guilty but mentally ill verdict appears to have some impact in cases that involve
serious crimes, but has otherwise failed to reduce NGRI verdicts as intended. However, it is
important to note that archival data may be limited with regard to the effect on jurors’ verdict
decisions because many NGRI and GBMI verdicts result from judges’ decisions during bench
trials or plea bargains (Golding, 1991; Morgan et al., 1988; Smith & Hall, 1982). In addition, as
discussed previously, it is also difficult to draw firm conclusions from the data because various
changes in the insanity statutes occurred around the same time that the GBMI laws were enacted.
Mock Juror Studies on the GBMI Verdict
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Numerous studies have explored the impact of GBMI verdict option on mock juror
verdict preferences. In contrast to archival research, mock juror studies have consistently shown
that the availability of a GBMI verdict results in displacement of both NGRI and guilty verdicts
(Finkel & Duff, 1989; Poulson, 1990; Poulson, Braithwaite, Brondino, & Wuensch, 1997;
Poulson, Wuensch, & Brondino, 1998; Roberts et al., 1987; Roberts & Golding, 1991; Roberts,
Sargent, & Chan, 1993; Sales & Shuman, 1996; Savitsky & Lindblom, 1986).
Savinsky and Lindblom (1986) presented 145 mock jurors with a case involving a
mentally ill defendant. Mock jurors’ verdict options varied among the following three
conditions: the two-choice condition (guilty and not guilty), the three-choice condition (guilty,
not guilty, and NGRI), or the four-choice condition (guilty, not guilty, NGRI and GBMI). The
strength of evidence for the case was also manipulated. When the evidence presented against the
defendant was strong, no significant differences in verdict preferences were found between the
two-, three-, and four-choice conditions. When the evidence was weak, however, mock jurors in
the two- and three-choice conditions were more likely to acquit the defendant than those who
were given the GBMI verdict option in the four-choice condition. The same results were found
after 6-person juries deliberated. Savinsky and Lindblom (1986) noted: “When the GBMI verdict
was not available, the dominant view was that the defendant was innocent, but when the GBMI
verdict did become available then the dominant view was that the defendant was guilty” (p.696).
Roberts et al. (1987) examined how beliefs about insanity and responsibility impact juror
decision-making. Mock jurors were presented with 16 case vignettes that described a mentally ill
defendant and details of the events surrounding the murder of a man. Each condition varied the
defendant’s clinical diagnosis, as well as the bizarreness and planfulness of the defendant’s
actions. When the defendant was portrayed as experiencing schizophrenic delusions pertaining to

30

the victim along with a lack of planfulness, 95% of mock jurors found the defendant NGRI.
When the GBMI verdict became an option, however, only 18% of the mock jurors found that
same defendant NGRI, while 77% chose the GBMI option. In other words, the defendant who
had been almost unanimously acquitted was found GBMI when the alternative verdict was
available. The introduction of the GBMI option also reduced the number the number of guilty
verdicts when the defendant was portrayed as having a less severe form of mental illness, such as
a personality disorder. Planfulness also played a significant role in mock jurors’ verdict
decisions; in fact, the GBMI verdict was chosen 2.5 times more often than the other verdict
options when the defendant did not exhibit planfulness. A majority of the mock jurors (86%)
endorsed the statement that "GBMI sentencing alternative was moral, just, and an adequate
means of providing for the treatment needs of mentally ill offenders” (p. 220). In addition to an
expectation for treatment, the authors suggest that laypersons prefer the GBMI verdict “even in
the most obvious cases of ‘real’ insanity” in large part because of the fear that a severely
mentally ill individual may eventually reenter society and present a threat to public safety” (p.
226).
In a similar study, Poulson (1990) assessed how the availability of the GBMI verdict
affected mock jurors' attributions of criminal responsibility. The race of the defendant and the
victim were manipulated to determine if there is a race disparity among insanity acquittees.
Replicating the findings by Roberts et al. (1987), results indicated that when the GBMI verdict
was an option, NGRI and guilty verdicts were decreased by nearly two-thirds. Contrary to the
author’s hypotheses, black defendants were found NGRI significantly more often than white
defendants, and white defendants and black defendants were equally likely to be found GBMI.
Further, race of the victim did not significantly influence mock jurors’ verdict choices.
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In a study by Roberts and Golding (1991), the impact of the availability of the GBMI
verdict on mock jurors’ verdicts was demonstrated once again. The authors analyzed the rates of
NGRI verdicts when 145 students and 144 jury-eligible community members were presented
with a case vignette. Mock jurors were randomly assigned to an “instructional condition” and
were asked to read either (1) the traditional American Law Institute (ALI) judicial instructions or
(2) ALI instructions supplemented with GBMI instructions. The GBMI judicial instructions,
which utilized the precise language of Illinois law, stated:
A person who, at the time of the commission of a criminal offense, was not insane but was
suffering from a mental illness, is not relieved of criminal responsibility for his conduct
and may be found guilty but mentally ill. (Illinois Revised Statutes, 1985. Chapter 8,
Section6-2.(c).)
Results showed a decrease in the rate of NGRI verdicts from 60% (ALI instructions) to
35% (ALI and GBMI instructions). Comparable to previous studies, the availability of GBMI
judicial instructions and verdict option significantly reduced the number of mock jurors’ NGRI
verdicts when the case involved a defendant presenting with psychosis (hallucinations and
delusions). (Roberts & Golding, 1991).
In the same study, mock jurors’ attitudes toward the insanity defense were assessed using
twenty items from Hans’ (1986) Insanity Defense Attitudes Scale and a thirteen-item scale
developed by Roberts, Golding, & Fincham (1987). The newly developed scale by Roberts,
Golding, & Fincham (1987) focused on the blameworthiness of defendants who pursue the
insanity defense. For example, one item stated “People with mental illness, regardless of
severity, are equally blameworthy as non-mentally ill persons as far as socially deviant behavior
is concerned” (pp. 363-364). Similar to previous studies (Homant & Kennedy; Roberst et al,
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1987), the authors concluded that mock jurors’ attitudes toward the insanity defense were
predictive of verdicts. More specifically, mock jurors who chose both GBMI and guilty verdicts
tended to be “uncertain” or “moderately supportive” of the insanity defense, while mock jurors
who chose the NGRI verdict option strongly supported the insanity defense (Roberts & Golding,
1991, p. 360).
Roberts et al. (1993) summarized the mock jury data on the impact of the GBMI verdict
option by stating that "this pronounced `verdict-shifting' phenomenon has been demonstrated for
the within- and between-participants research designs, at the individual juror and jury levels of
analysis, across diagnostic classes of defendants, and with college and community samples" (p.
262). In sum, the alternative GBMI verdict option has consistently been shown to significantly
influence mock jurors' insanity case verdict choices.
Summary
In order to lay the groundwork for the current study, this chapter reviewed the literature on
the history of the insanity defense and the GBMI verdict, GBMI procedure, as well as archival
and empirical research on the impact of the GBMI verdict. Much of this review focused on the
concerns that scholars have expressed regarding of the GBMI verdict. In particular, researchers
have cautioned that jurors might erroneously assume, based on the verdict language, that GBMI
is a middle-ground verdict (Finkel, 1995, Finkel & Fulero, 1992, Poulson, Wuensch & Brondino,
1998). It has also been suggested that the verdict wording could give jurors the impression that a
defendant found GBMI will receive treatment for their mental illness; in truth, treatment is not
guaranteed. Researchers have even argued that leaving jurors in the dark about verdict
consequences constitutes deception (Melville & Naimark, 2002). Although previous studies have
examined the impact of informing jurors of the dispositional consequences of the NGRI verdict,
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no study to date has investigated the impact of informing jurors of the dispositional
consequences of the GBMI verdict. Additionally, the current study is the first to explore the
potential for attitudes toward the insanity defense, attitudes toward mentally ill individuals, and
perceptions of the defendant’s dangerousness to moderate the relationship between dispositional
consequence information and verdict selection.
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CHAPTER THREE:
METHODS
Introduction
The study methodology presented in this chapter were utilized to address four key
objectives: (1) assess juror knowledge of the GBMI and NGRI verdicts in order to confirm the
previous finding that jurors are misinformed or unaware of GBMI and NGRI dispositional
consequences; (2) examine whether informing mock jurors of accurate dispositional
consequences of the GBMI and NGRI verdicts impacts juror verdict selection; (3) explore mock
jurors’ attitudes regarding the insanity defense and mentally ill individuals and whether they
moderate the relationship between dispositional consequence knowledge and verdict choice; and
(4) explore whether perceptions of the defendant’s dangerousness moderate the relationship
between dispositional consequence knowledge and verdict choice. This chapter includes a
discussion of the participants, materials, measures, procedures, research questions and
hypotheses.
Participants
Five-hundred and twenty community members were recruited to participate in this study
online through the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) website turkprime.com. Amazon MTurk
is an online service that allows individuals to receive monetary compensation for completing
online surveys. The recruitment information included basic information about the study and
directed the participants to a link to the Qualtrics survey. MTurk workers are assigned an
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anonymous ID number and are not asked for any identifying information, therefore maintaining
their confidentiality.
In recent years, Mturk has become an increasingly common and accepted approach for
gathering social science research data (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Mason & Suri,
2012). In order to examine the demographics of Mturk workers residing in the Unites States,
Mason & Suri (2012) collected data from 3,000 workers over the course of 3 years. The authors
found that the demographics of U.S. MTurk workers were similar to the demographics of the
general U.S. population. Specifically, 55% of workers were female; they ranged from 18 years
old to over 65 years old, and the median age was 30 years old. The majority of the workers
reported that their approximate income was $30,000/year. Research has also shown that
demographic characteristics of U.S. MTurk workers are more representative and diverse than the
undergraduate student samples typically used in social science studies (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz,
2011). In addition, results from studies conducted on Mturk have been found to have high testretest reliability and have replicated findings of studies conducted in more traditional research
settings (Mason & Suri, 2012; Thomas, 2016).
Research has shown that including an attention check questions, which identify
individuals that are not carefully reading and answering questions, can be helpful in improving
the quality of data from MTurk workers (Aust, Diedenhofen, Ullrich & Musch, 2012;
Buhrmester, Kwang , & Gosling, 2011). Thus, a question was included that instructed the
participants to select a specific answer; if a participant failed to select the correct answer, their
data was excluded from analyses. Another technique that has been shown to improve data quality
is limiting participation to workers with a history of satisfactory completion of MTurk tasks
(Peer, Vosgerau, & Acquisti, 2014). Therefore, in order to be eligible for the current study,
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MTurk workers were required to have a minimum approval rating of 98%, which indicates that
they satisfactorily completed 98% of their previous tasks. Participants also had to be United
States citizens and at least 18 years of age. The informed consent document listed these criteria
and requested that only jury-eligible individuals participate in the survey. Participants were
compensated $1.00 for completion of the study measures.
Data from 32 participants were excluded from the study due to the following reasons:
Failure to answer to correctly answer the attention check question correctly (11 participants),
incomplete survey (6 participants), and completing the survey in less than 10 minutes (15
participants). The final sample included 488 participants. Of the 488 participants, 246
participants were assigned to the informed group and were instructed on the dispositional
consequences of the verdicts. 242 participants were assigned to the uninformed group and were
not instructed regarding dispositional consequences of the verdicts.
Materials
The relevant materials presented to participants are located in the Appendix.
Insanity Case Vignette
Participants were asked to read an insanity case vignette involving a mentally ill
defendant who is charged with first-degree murder. This particular vignette was chosen because
it was previously utilized in juror decision-making studies authored by Roberts et al. (1987) and
Skeem and Golding (2001). Both of the studies found that jurors’ verdicts were evenly
distributed among the options, which suggests that the vignette allows room for individual
interpretation of the defendant’s mental state and culpability.
The vignette describes the case of a 24-year-old defendant, Jeffrey Smith, who is charged
with the first-degree murder of Michael Jones, a 43-year-old mail carrier. Smith’s attorney has
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entered a plea of Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity. The details of the case include that Jones’
body was discovered in the back alley of the tavern where Smith worked as a dishwasher.
Eyewitnesses reported that Smith left his post in the kitchen shortly after Jones had paid his tab.
Smith was arrested near the tavern with a bloodstained knife in his possession. Forensic testing
later revealed that the knife was covered in Jones’ blood and had the defendant’s fingerprints on
the handle. A court-appointed psychologist and psychiatrist testify that Smith has a history of
hallucinations and delusions, including a long-held belief that “a group of aliens is conspiring to
take over the world.”
Dispositional Consequence Information
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions for dispositional
consequence information. Participants in the informed condition read an explanation of the
dispositional consequences of not guilty, GBMI, NGRI, and guilty verdicts. Participants in the
uninformed condition did not read an explanation of the consequences of GBMI and NGRI
verdicts; instead, they read a paragraph explaining their responsibilities as a juror.
Dependent Measures
Participants were instructed to choose one of the four verdict options: Guilty, Not Guilty,
NGRI and GBMI. In addition, participants were asked to rate their confidence in their verdict on
a percentage scale ranging from 0-100.
Juror Knowledge Measure
All participants were assessed for their knowledge of dispositional consequences for
verdicts. The five items utilized to test the participants’ knowledge of dispositional outcomes
questions were analyzed independently and combined into a summary knowledge score. One
multiple-choice question for the GBMI verdict and one for the GBMI verdict assessed the
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participants’ knowledge of the dispositional consequences of these verdicts. Specifically, the
questions asked the participants to choose the immediate outcome of GBMI and NGRI verdicts.
For a GBMI verdict, the correct answer is “confinement in a correctional facility.” For a NGRI
verdict, the correct answer is “mandatory confinement in a mental hospital.” Two true-or-false
questions further investigated the participants’ knowledge of GBMI dispositional consequences.
The items stated the following: “If the defendant is found GBMI, he is not eligible to receive the
death penalty?” and “If the defendant is found GBMI, he is guaranteed treatment for his mental
illness.” The correct answer for both items is “false.” A final multiple choice question asked the
participants to identify the dispositional consequence for the verdict that they selected. The
answer options included “confinement in a correctional facility (jail or prison)”, “confinement in
a psychiatric hospital”, and “released back into society.” The correct answer for GBMI and
guilty verdicts is “confinement in a correctional facility (jail or prison). The correct answer for a
NGRI verdict is “confinement in a psychiatric hospital.”
Insanity Defense Attitudes Measure
Participants’ attitudes toward the insanity defense were measured using Insanity Defense
Attitudes-Revised (IDA-R) (Skeem, Louden, & Evans, 2004). The original IDA scale was
revised after Skeem and colleagues (2004) conducted studies with the intention of creating a
more valid and reliable measure. In the first study, 187 venirepersons were recruited from the
Third District Court in Utah and asked to complete a 35-item questionnaire. The primary goal of
the was to identify and eliminate the items that were strongly correlated with Social Desirability
on the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSD), as well as items with low response
variability. In addition, the authors aimed to select items with high item-total correlations. The
modified scale measured two dimensions: Strict Liability and Perceived Injustice and Danger. A
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principal components analysis revealed that the two dimensions accounted for 55% of the total
variance. Another study was conducted in Nevada’s Eighth Judicial District Court in order to
cross-validate the IDA-R in another state. Similar to the previous study, results indicated a twofactor structure with good internal consistency (Strict Liability, a = .80; Perceived Injustice and
Danger, a = .90) (Skeem, Louden, & Evans, 2004).
The IDA-R assesses beliefs about mental illness and criminal responsibility, as well as
perceptions of misuse of the insanity defense. The revised measure has 13 statements, which are
rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale. As mentioned previously, the scale is comprised of two
dimensions. The first dimension, Strict Liability, relates to participants’ perceptions of mental
illness and its impact on criminal responsibility. The second dimension, Perceived Injustice and
Danger, relates to participants’ perceptions of the use (or misuse) of the insanity defense and the
potential injustice that could occur. The IDA-R was utilized in the current study as a potential
moderator variable. Specifically, moderation analyses were conducted to see whether the
relationship between being informed of dispositional consequences and verdict option is affected
by the participant’s attitudes toward the insanity defense.
Mental Illness Attitudes Measure
Participants completed the Community Attitudes Toward Mental Illness Scale (CAMI),
which was developed by Taylor and Dear (1981) to assess attitudes toward community members
with mental illness. The CAMI asks participants to respond to 40 statements rated on a 5-point
Likert-type scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The scale measures attitudes
toward the mentally ill on four dimensions: Authoritarianism, Benevolence, Social
Restrictiveness and Community Mental Health Ideology. The first dimension, Authoritarianism,
relates to negative views of mentally ill individuals and their treatment. Conversely, the
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Benevolence dimension relates to positive views toward mentally ill individuals and their
treatment. The Social Restrictiveness dimension relates to the perception that mentally ill
individuals are a threat to the community. Lastly, the Community Mental Health Ideology
dimension relates to the view that mentally ill individuals are best treated in the community as
opposed to in a hospital setting.
Taylor and Dear (1981) tested the reliability of the CAMI on a sample of 321 students
and 54 adult community members. Alpha coefficients on the subscales are as follows: .68
(Authoritarianism), .88 (Community Mental Health Ideology), .76 (Benevolence), and .80
(Social Restrictiveness). The CAMI was used in the current study as a potential moderator
variable.
Perceived Dangerousness of the Defendant Measure
A series of statements about the defendant were created specifically for this study. A
principal component analysis (PCA) was performed and the items were combined into a scale as
appropriate. The purpose of these items was to ascertain whether perceptions of the defendant’s
dangerousness moderate the relationship between dispositional consequence knowledge and
verdict selection.
Demographic Questionnaire
Participants were asked to respond to a series of demographic questions regarding the
following variables: sex, age, race, education level, income level, political affiliation, and
participants’ personal/family history of mental illness.
Procedure
Upon approval of the study protocol, the researcher received IRB permission to conduct
the research. Participants were recruited through the Amazon Mechanical Turk website

41

mturk.com. They were asked to review an online informed consent document. Participants then
read an insanity case vignette of an apparently mentally ill male defendant charged with firstdegree murder. After reading the case vignette, participants were randomly assigned to a
condition (informed vs. uninformed). Half of the participants were informed of the dispositional
consequences of GBMI and NGRI verdicts, while the other half of participants received no such
information. Then, they were asked to choose individual verdicts, as well as indicate their
confidence level in their verdict. Next, participants answered a series of questions intended to
assess their knowledge of accurate GBMI and NGRI dispositional consequences. The IDA-R and
the CAMI were administered to assess participants’ attitudes toward the insanity defense and
mental illness, and then participants answered questions about their perceptions of the
defendant’s dangerousness. Lastly, participants completed a demographic questionnaire.
Research Questions
The current study addresses several research questions in an attempt to gain a clearer
understanding of the impact of informing mock jurors of dispositional consequences for GBMI
and NGRI verdicts. Further, it explores whether mock jurors’ attitudes toward the insanity
defense, individuals with mental illness, and perceptions of the defendant’s dangerousness
strengthens or attenuates the impact of informing mock jurors of dispositional consequences. The
following questions will be addressed:
Research Question 1: Are jurors aware of accurate dispositional consequences of GBMI
and NGRI verdicts?
Research Question 2: Does informing jurors of dispositional consequences impact
verdicts?
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Research Question 3: Is the impact of informing jurors of dispositional consequences
moderated by juror attitudes (toward the insanity defense and mental illness)?
Research Question 4: Is the impact of informing jurors of dispositional consequences
moderated by jurors’ perceptions of the defendant’s dangerousness?
Hypotheses
Knowledge of Dispositional Consequences
As discussed previously, research indicates that jurors’ have limited knowledge of the
outcomes of mental illness verdicts (Sloat & Frierson, 2005). Therefore, it is hypothesized
(Hypothesis 1) that participants in the uninformed group will not accurately identify the
dispositional consequences of GBMI and NGRI verdicts. Further, participants in the uninformed
group will less accurately identify the dispositional consequences of GBMI and NGRI verdicts
compared to participants in the informed group. This will also serve as a manipulation check of
the experimental manipulation.
Impact of Dispositional Consequences on Verdicts
Previous research revealed that informing jurors of dispositional consequences for NGRI
verdicts impacted jury verdicts (Wheatman & Shaffer, 2001; Whittemore & Ogloff, 1995). The
current study differs from prior investigations by including the dispositional consequences of
GBMI verdicts; however, similar results are anticipated. Thus, it is hypothesized that informing
participants of the dispositional consequences of GBMI and NGRI verdicts will significantly
impact verdicts. Specifically, it is hypothesized (Hypothesis 2) that participants in the informed
condition will be more likely to render NGRI verdicts than participants in the uninformed
condition. Participants in the informed condition may be more inclined to choose a lenient
verdict because they are not misinformed or making incorrect assumptions about GBMI and
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NGRI verdict consequences. In particular, many jurors may erroneously believe that GBMI is an
intermediate verdict option between guilty and NGRI, and that defendants found GBMI are
guaranteed treatment. Therefore, it is expected that participants who are informed of accurate
dispositional consequences of the GBMI and NGRI verdicts (i.e., GBMI is equivalent to a guilty
verdict and does not guarantee treatment) will be more likely to choose a NGRI verdict.
Moderation Analyses
Although the main focus of this research is to ascertain the impact of providing
dispositional information on verdict preferences, this effect might be moderated by various juror
attitudes and perceptions. Specifically, we hypothesized that providing dispositional information
leads to more NGRI verdicts (compared to GMBI verdicts) especially when the participant has
more positive attitudes as measured on the IDA-R (Hypothesis 3) and CAMI (Hypothesis 4).
Scholars have suggested that jurors’ attitudes impact their comprehension and use of jury
instructions (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Gordon, 2013). In fact, a study by Smith (1993) revealed that
jurors’ preexisting ideas about crimes impacted how they interpreted judicial instructions and
impacted decision-making. While this is an interesting perspective, there are additional
compelling reasons to believe that jurors’ attitudes will be influential in this study. That is, if a
participant has more positive attitudes toward the insanity defense, they might be even more
likely to choose the NGRI verdict when informed about the consequences of this verdict because
they are already more inclined to believe the insanity defense is reasonable in some cases.
Further, when they understand the consequences of the GBMI verdict and recognize it conflicts
with their attitudes, they might be more likely to select the NGRI verdict. Similarly, more
positive attitudes toward individuals with mental illness on the CAMI (which include beliefs that
mentally ill can be effectively treated and benevolent attitudes that they deserve treatment)
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would be expected to lead to a verdict of NGRI, and this would be particularly true among
participants specifically informed that the NGRI verdict guarantees treatment, while the GBMI
verdict does not.
We also hypothesize that providing dispositional consequence information will lead to
more NGRI verdicts (compared to GBMI verdicts) especially when the participant perceives the
defendant as less dangerous (Hypothesis 5). Although there are no previous studies that suggest
this moderation, intuition suggests that participants who have a less negative view of the
defendant might select the NGRI verdict because they believe he deserves or would benefit from
the treatment that it promises. Again, once they are aware NGRI is the only option that
guarantees treatment, it may seem like the most appropriate choice.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
RESULTS
Overview
The results of the current study are presented in six sections. The first section discusses
the sample demographics. Next, the knowledge of dispositional consequences findings are
reported. This begins with the manipulation check, which compares the knowledge of NGRI and
GBMI dispositional consequences between the informed and uninformed groups. Additionally,
the knowledge of dispositional consequences results from the uninformed group are also
applicable to answering Research Question 1: Are jurors aware of dispositional consequences of
NGRI and GBMI verdicts? The third section of this chapter reports results for the bivariate
analyses on juror attitudes and perceptions. The fourth section presents the findings on verdict
selection. The bivariate analyses on juror attitudes and verdict are presented in the fifth section.
The final section reports the results of the multinomial logistic regression models.
Sample
The sample demographics for the current study, which consisted of 488 community
members, are presented in Table 1. The majority of the sample (59%) were women and 85% of
the participants identified as White. The age of participants ranged from 18-87 and the average
age was 38 years old. Seventy-three percent of the sample attended college or had a college
degree or higher. Political views were fairly evenly dispersed among the three categories.
Specifically, 43% of the participants described their political views as liberal, 33% described
their political views as moderate, and 23% described their political views as conservative.
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Approximately half of the sample reported that they practice a religion. Sixty percent of the
sample reported that their personal income was below $45,000. A total of 78 participants had
previously served on a jury; 7 had previously served as the foreperson. Forty-four percent of the
participants reported knowing someone with a mental illness, 20% reported a personal history of
mental illness.
Table 1
Sample Demographics (n = 488)
Demographic Variables

n

%

Race
White

415

85

Black

38

7.8

2

.4

Asian

26

5.3

Other

7

1.4

Less than high school

2

.4

High school graduate

38

7.8

Some college

148

30.3

Undergraduate degree

210

43

Professional degree

21

4.3

Master’s degree

53

10.9

Doctorate

16

3.3

0 - $30,000

181

37.1

$30,000 - $45,000

115

23.6

American Indian

Education

Personal Income
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Table 1 continued
Demographic Variables

n

%

$45,001 - $60,000

93

19.1

$60,001 - $75,000

42

8.6

$75,000+

57

11.7

Juror Knowledge of Dispositional Consequences
Participants answered five questions assessing their knowledge of dispositional
consequences. Two hundred and forty-six participants in the informed group read an explanation
of the dispositional consequences of the verdict options. Conversely, 242 participants in the
uninformed group did not read an explanation of the dispositional consequences of NGRI and
GBMI verdicts; rather, they read a description of their responsibilities as a juror. Correct answers
were coded as one; higher scores indicate greater understanding of the dispositional
consequences of the verdict options.
Manipulation Check
Analyses were performed to ensure that the study manipulation was successful and
participants in the informed group were more knowledgeable of the dispositional consequences
of verdicts than the participants in the uninformed group. The results of the knowledge of
dispositional information analysis are presented in Table 2.
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Table 2
Crosstabs Juror Knowledge by Condition, n = 488
No Information
Answer

n

%

Information
n

%

p

Based on your verdict choice, what do you believe is the immediate fate of the
defendant?
Incorrect

126

52.1%

33

13.4%

Correct

116

47.9%

213

86.6%

.000

A “Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity” (NGRI) verdict nearly always results in:
Incorrect

54

22.3%

32

13.0%

Correct

188

77.7%

214

87.0%

.007

A “Guilty but Mentally Ill” (GBMI) verdict nearly always results in:
Incorrect

218

90.1%

166

67.5%

Correct

24

9.9%

80

32.5%

.000

If the defendant is found GBMI, he is not eligible to receive the death penalty.
Incorrect

198

81.8%

171

69.5%

Correct

44

18.2%

75

30.5%

.002

If the defendant is found GBMI, he is guaranteed treatment for his mental illness.
Incorrect

161

66.5%

65

26.4%

Correct

81

33.5%

181

73.6%
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.000

The results of chi-square tests of significance for each dispositional knowledge question
are reported below. The first dispositional knowledge question asked participants to correctly
identify the dispositional consequence for the verdict that they chose for the defendant.
Specifically, the multiple choice item asked: “What do you believe is the immediate fate of the
defendant?” A higher percentage of the participants in the informed group answered the question
correctly than those in the uninformed group (χ2 (1) = 82.95, p < .001). For the second multiplechoice item “A ‘Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity’ (NGRI) verdict nearly always results in”, a
higher percentage of the participants in the informed group answered the questions correctly than
those in the uninformed group (χ2 (1) = 7.28, p = .007). For the item multiple-choice item “A
‘Guilty but Mentally Ill’ (GBMI) verdict nearly always results in”, a higher percentage of the
participants in the informed group answered the questions correctly than those in the uninformed
group (χ2 (1)= 37.17, p < .001). For the true-or-false item “If the defendant is found GBMI, he is
not eligible to receive the death penalty.”, a higher percentage of the participants in the informed
group answered the questions correctly than those in the uninformed group (χ2 (1) = 37.17, p <
.000). For the true-or-false item “If the defendant is found GBMI, he is guaranteed treatment for
his mental illness.”, a higher percentage of the participants in the informed group answered the
questions correctly than those in the ‘not informed’ group (χ2 (1) = 78.92, p < .001). To
summarize, for each dispositional knowledge question, the informed group answered the
question correctly at a significantly higher rate than the uninformed group.
The mean ‘knowledge of dispositional consequences’ score was calculated based on the
number of correct responses out of five questions. Results of an independent samples t-test show
that the mean ‘knowledge of dispositional consequences’ scores in the informed group (M = 3.1,
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SD = 1.19) were significantly higher than the mean in the uninformed group (M = 1.87, SD =
1.02; t(486) = -12.23, p = .007). Twenty-nine participants in the informed group were able to
answer all five dispositional consequences questions correctly, while only 3 participants in the
uninformed group were able to answer all the questions correctly.
Juror Knowledge in the Uninformed Condition
The results presented in the previous section serve not only as manipulation checks, but
also address Research Question 1: Are jurors aware of dispositional consequences of NGRI and
GBMI verdicts? Specifically, the dispositional consequences knowledge items from the ‘not
informed’ group were examined to confirm that prospective jurors are uninformed regarding the
dispositional consequences for NGRI and GBMI verdicts (Sloat & Frierson, 2005). The results
support the hypothesis that jurors are not accurately informed about the dispositional
consequences of GBMI verdicts. For the question “What do you believe is the immediate fate of
the defendant?”, the majority of participants in the uninformed group (52%) were unable to
identify the correct dispositional consequence for the verdict they had chosen. Further, among
the participants who chose the GBMI verdict, 76.7% incorrectly believed that the immediate fate
of the defendant was confinement in a psychiatric hospital; 66.4% incorrectly believed the
defendant was guaranteed treatment.
Juror Attitudes
Three measures of participants’ attitudes were administered in order to predict verdict
choices. The Community Attitudes Toward Mental Illness Scale (CAMI) is comprised of 40
items on a 5-point Likert scale with greater numbers indicating less stigmatizing attitudes
towards mental illness (M = 4.89, SD = .90). Mean scores on this measure did not differ across
the ‘informed’ and ‘not informed’ conditions (t(486) = .410, p = .682). The Insanity Defense
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Attitudes-Revised scale (IDA-R) consists of 13 items on a 7-point Likert scale with greater
numbers indicating more favorable attitudes toward the insanity defense (M = 4.42, SD = 1.34).
Mean scores on this measure did not differ by condition (unequal variances, t(475.3) = .663, p =
.508).
A Perceived Dangerousness scale was created for the current study, which was composed
of five items asking about the jurors’ perceptions of the defendant. Specifically, a principal
components analysis with oblimin rotations was used to analyze the factor structure of nine
statements about the defendant. There was some ambiguity between a two and three factor
solution based on the scree plot of variance explained (which argued for a three factor solution)
and interpretability of factors (which argued for a two factor solution), but both yield the same
five items in the first factor that is conceptually of interest for further analysis. Therefore, the
following five items were used to create the measure of Perceived Dangerousness: “the
defendant is likely to commit an act of violence in the future if he is not in a secure facility”; “the
defendant has a criminal personality”; “the defendant is a danger to society”; “the defendant has
no remorse”; “the defendant is culpable (responsible) for this crime”. These items had a good
reliability (a = .788), and the remaining items about the defendant were not used for further
analyses. Each of the 5 items was rated on a 7-point Likert scale and recoded so that greater
numbers indicate more perceived dangerousness (M = 4.91, SD = .97). Means scores on this
measure did not differ by condition (t(486) = -1.13, p = .258).
These three attitudinal measures were all significantly correlated. IDA-R scores and
CAMI are positively correlated indicating that more favorable attitudes toward the insanity
defense correspond to less stigmatizing attitudes towards mental illness (r = .551, p < .001). Both
IDA-R and CAMI are negatively correlated with scores on Perceived Dangerousness indicating
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that more favorable attitudes toward the insanity defense and less stigmatizing attitudes towards
mental illness correspond to lower levels of perceived dangerousness in this particular vignette
(IDA-R r = -.584, p < .001; CAMI r = -.466, p < .001).
As the three predictors of interest, the attitude measures were further examined for
differences by demographics. There were no significant correlations of these attitudes by age,
although increasing age was in the direction of more stigmatizing attitudes toward mental illness
on the CAMI scale (r = -.078, p = .084). Spearman’s rho was used to analyze correlations of
ordinal demographic variables of education level, personal income (reported in categories), and
political views (with increasing values indicating more conservative views) with the three
attitude measures. Higher education was significantly associated with less stigmatizing attitudes
toward mental illness (increasing CAMI, rs = .092, p = .043) and more favorable attitudes toward
the insanity defense (increasing IDA-R, rs = .090, p = .047). Higher income was only
significantly associated with less favorable attitudes toward the insanity defense (increasing
IDA-R, rs = -.110, p = .015). More conservative political views were significantly associated
with more stigmatizing attitudes toward the mental illness (decreasing CAMI, rs = -.355, p <
.001), less favorable attitudes toward the insanity defense (decreasing IDA-R, rs = -.406, p <
.001), and increased perceptions of dangerousness of the defendant (rs = .300, p < .001). It
should be noted that these demographic variables are themselves correlated. Specifically, higher
education corresponds to greater income (rs = .366, p < .001), and greater income corresponds to
greater conservatism (rs = .148, p = .001). There was no significant relationship between
education and conservatism (rs = -.060, p = .186).
Verdict Selection
Across the full sample, 56% of participants selected a GBMI verdict, 35% selected a
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NGRI verdict, 8% selected a guilty verdict, and only 2% selected a not guilty verdict. A chisquare test of significance indicated that verdict selection differed significantly by dispositional
consequence condition (χ2 (3) = 8.72, p = .033). Table 3 presents the results for verdict selection
by condition (informed vs. uninformed). The highest percentage of both groups selected the
GBMI verdict; however, the uninformed group tended to select the GBMI verdict relatively more
often, while the informed group selected the NGRI verdict relatively more often.
Table 3
Cross tabulation - Condition (Informed, un informed) by Verdict, n = 488
Verdict
Condition
Not Informed

Informed

n

%

n

%

Not guilty

5

2.1%

3

1.2%

Not guilty by reason of insanity

70

28.9%

102

41.5%

Guilty but mentally ill

146

60.3%

125

50.8%

Guilty

21

8.7%

16

6.5%

Note. χ2 (3, n=488) = 8.72, p = .033
Participants who selected the guilty verdict were significantly more confident in their
verdict choice than those who selected NGBI and GBMI verdicts. There was not a significant
effect of information condition on people's confidence in their verdict selection, however it was a
marginal effect (p = .078) in the direction of participants in the uninformed group being more
confident. Due to infrequent choice of a not guilty verdict, the 8 participants who selected this
option were excluded from further analyses.
Juror Attitudes and Verdicts
An analysis of variance indicated that CAMI scores were significantly different by
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verdict selection group (F(2) = 16.37, p < .001). Post hoc Tukey tests showed that each group
differed significantly from each other group. Participants who selected a NGRI verdict had the
highest average CAMI scores, indicating that participants who chose a NGRI verdict had more
positive (less stigmatizing) attitudes toward individuals with mental illness compared to those
who selected Guilty (mean difference = .35, SE .09, p < .001.), and those who selected a GBMI
(mean difference = .81, SE = .16, p < .001). Participants who selected a guilty verdict had the
lowest average CAMI score, indicating that participants who chose a guilty verdict had the most
negative (more stigmatizing) attitudes toward individuals with mental illness (mean difference
compared to GBMI = -.46, SE = .15, p = .008).
Participants’ attitudes toward the insanity defense also differed by verdict choice (F(2) =
61.56, p < .001). Post hoc Tukey tests showed that each group differed significantly from each
other group. The highest average scores on the IDA-R were observed for the participants who
selected a NGRI verdict, indicating that participants who chose the NGRI verdict had the most
favorable attitudes toward the insanity defense compared to those who selected GBMI (mean
difference = 1.02, SE = .12, p < .001) and guilty (mean difference = 1.99, SE = .22, p < .001).
Participants who selected a guilty verdict had the lowest average IDA-R scores, indicating that
participants who chose the guilty verdict had the least favorable attitudes toward the insanity
defense (mean difference compared to GBMI = -.97, SE =.21, p < .001).
Participants’ mean scores on the Perceived Dangerousness scale were also significantly
different by verdict choice (F(2) = 39.76, p < .001). Post hoc Tukey tests showed that each group
differed significantly from each other group. The highest average scores on the Perceived
Dangerousness scale were observed for participants who selected a guilty verdict compared to
those who selected NGRI (mean difference 1.17, SE = .16, p < .001) and GBMI (mean difference
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.53, SE = .16, p < .002). Participants who selected NGRI verdicts had the lowest average score,
indicating that they perceived the defendant as less dangerous than participants who selected
other verdict options (mean difference compared to GBMI = -.64, SE = .09, p < .001).
Multinomial Logistic Regression Models
Since the dependent variable (verdict) has four options (not guilty, NGRI, GBMI,
Guilty), a multinomial logistic regression was performed. The experimental condition (dummycoded), IDA-R scores, CAMI scores, and defendant characteristics are the predictors. Interaction
terms were created for the moderation analyses by multiplying the relevant variables, and
entering them into the models. Each interaction term was examined independently.
Each of the models controlled for the participant sex (dummy-coded male = 0, female =
1), age, race (dummy-coded white = 0, non-white = 1), level of education, and income category.
GBMI was used as the reference category for the dependent variable. Again, the 8 participants
who selected the Not Guilty verdict were excluded from the multinomial regression models due
to their small group size. For each of the three models testing the moderating effect of attitudes
toward the insanity defense, attitudes toward individuals with mental illness, and perceived
dangerousness of the defendant, the moderating variables were centered at their respective
means.
Table 4 presents the results of the base multinomial regression model (Model 1) that
tested the impact of informing jurors of dispositional consequences of GBMI and NGRI verdicts
(0 = uninformed, 1 = informed) on verdict selection while controlling for participant
demographic variables. The overall model was a significant improvement on the intercept only
model (χ2 (12) = 27.72, p = .006). Results show that the odds of selecting a NGRI verdict
compared to GBMI verdict were significantly lower among participants in the uninformed group.
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Said alternatively, the odds of selecting a NGRI verdict over a GBMI verdict were 1.7 times
higher in the informed group. However, informing jurors of dispositional consequences had no
effect on the odds of selecting a guilty verdict over a GBMI verdict.
Participant race had no association with selecting a NGRI verdict (p = 0.73) but White
participants were significantly more likely to select a guilty verdict over a GBMI verdict (OR =
2.29, 95% CI: 1.10-5.00). Women were less likely to select a NGRI verdict (OR = 0.59, 95%
CI: 0.40-0.89) and a guilty verdict (OR = 0.40, 95% CI: 0.19-0.81) than men. Education, age,
and income had no association with verdict selection (APPENDIX J).
Table 4
Multinomial Logistic Regression for Verdict by Condition, n = 480
Predictor
B
SE B
Wald
Sig
OR

95%CI

NGRI
Condition

.536*

.20

7.207

.007

1.709

1.156, 2.526

-.70

.360

.038

.846

.932

.460, 1.889

Guilty
Condition

Note. OR = odds ratio.
a
reference category for Verdict is Guilty But Mentally Ill
b
Uninformed condition was the reference category
*p < .01.
Attitudes Toward the Insanity Defense
Model 2 tested the association of dispositional consequence information condition and
attitudes towards the insanity defense on verdict selection. This model included participant
demographic variables, dispositional consequence information condition and IDA-R scores. The
overall model was a significant improvement on the intercept only model (χ2 (14) = 142.37, p <
.001), and there were main effects of more positive attitudes toward the insanity defense being
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associated with increased selection of the NGRI verdict over the GBMI verdict, and of decreased
selection of a guilty verdict over a GBMI verdict.
Model 3 entered the interaction of dispositional consequence information condition and
IDA-R scores to test if the association between condition and verdict choice varied as function of
participants’ attitudes toward an insanity defense (Table 5). This model was a significant
improvement over the main effects model (χ2 (2) = 8.34, p = .015). There was a significant
interaction between dispositional consequence information condition and attitudes towards an
insanity defense on the odds of selecting NGRI verdict over a GBMI verdict. The interaction
between insanity defense attitudes and dispositional consequence information condition on the
selection of a guilty verdict was not significant.
Similar to the base model, participant race had no association with selecting a NGRI
verdict (p = 0.59) but White participants were significantly more likely to select a guilty verdict
over a GBMI verdict (OR = 2.61, 95% CI: 1.129-6.049). Women were less likely to select a
guilty verdict (OR = 0.31, 95% CI: 0.143-0.672) than men. Education, age, and income had no
association with verdict selection (APPENDIX K).
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Table 5
Multinomial Logistic Regression for Verdict by Insanity Defense Attitude, Condition,
and Interaction between Insanity Defense Attitude and Condition, n = 480
Predictor
B
SE B
Wald
Sig
OR
95%CI
NGRI
Insanity defense
attitude

.436**

.135

10.434

.001

1.547

1.187, 2.015

Condition

.509*

.226

5.073

.024

1.664

1.068, 2.591

Interaction

.550**

.198

7.719

.005

1.733

1.176, 2.555

-.862**

.259

11.035

.001

.422

.254, .702

Condition

-.910

.643

2.001

.157

.403

.114, 1.420

Interaction

-.191

.393

.235

.628

.827

.383, 1.785

Guilty
Insanity defense
attitude

Note. Improvement of interaction model over main effects model: χ2 (2) = 8.34, p = .015.
a
reference category for Verdict is Guilty But Mentally Ill
b
Uninformed condition was the reference category
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
The two-way interaction between IDA-R scores and dispositional consequence
information condition on the odds of selecting a NGRI are presented in Figure 1. Participants
that reported more favorable attitudes toward an insanity defense had higher odds of selecting a
NGRI verdict; however the effect was stronger among participants in the informed group. In
other words, the effects of reporting favorable attitudes toward an insanity defense on increasing
the probabilities of selecting a NGRI verdict was even greater for participants in the informed
group. Participants that reported more favorable attitudes toward an insanity defense were less
likely to select guilty verdict. However, the association between attitudes to an insanity defense
and a selecting a guilty verdict did not vary between the informed and uninformed group.

59

Attitudes Toward Mental Illness
Model 4 tested the effects of informing jurors of dispositional consequences and attitudes
towards individuals with mental illness. The overall model that included the participant
demographic variables, dispositional consequence information condition, CAMI scale scores was
a significant improvement on the intercept only model (χ2 (14) = 60.36, p < .001). There was a
significant association between attitudes towards individuals with mental illness and the odds of
selecting a NGRI verdict. Specifically, a one-unit increase in CAMI scores (indicating more
positive attitudes towards individuals with mental illness) was associated with a 74% increase in
the odds of selecting a NGRI verdict over a GBMI verdict. There was also a significant
association between attitudes toward individuals with mental illness and the odds of selecting a
guilty verdict over a GBMI verdict. A one-unit increase in CAMI scores significantly reduced
the odds of selecting a guilty verdict by 39%.
The patterns of association between dispositional consequence information condition and
verdict selection that were observed in this model were consistent with patterns observed in the
base model. Participants in the informed group were significantly more likely to select a NGRI
verdict over a GBMI verdict (OR = 1.81, 95% CI: 1.21-2.70). There was no association between
condition and the odds of selecting a guilty verdict (OR = .847, 95% CI: 0.41-1.74). Model 5
then entered an interaction between condition and CAMI scale scores was not a significant
improvement on the main effects model (χ2 (2) = 3.10, p = .21) and the interaction term was not
statistically significantly for either the selection of a NGRI verdict or a guilty verdict (Table 6).
As in the base model, women were less likely to select a NGRI verdict (OR = 0.49, 95%
CI: 0.32-0.75) and a guilty verdict (OR = 0.47, 95% CI: 0.23-0.98) than men. Education, age,
and income had no association with verdict selection (APPENDIX L).
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Table 6
Multinomial Logistic Regression for Verdict by Attitudes Toward Mental Illness, Condition,
and Interaction between Attitudes Toward Mental Illness and Condition, n = 480
Predictor
B
SE B
Wald
Sig
OR
95%CI
NGRI
Mental illness
attitude

.358

.185

3.739

.053

1.430

.995, 2.055

Condition

-.536

.207

6.688

.010

1.708

1.138, 2.563

Interaction

.344

.245

1.970

.160

1.410

.873, 2.280

-.334

.289

1.335

.248

.716

.407, 1.261

Condition

.390

.434

.808

.369

1.478

.289, 1.585

Interaction

-.345

.422

.669

.414

.708

.310, 1.619

Guilty
Mental illness
attitude

Note. No improvement of interaction model over main effects: χ2 (2) = 3.10, p = .21.
a
reference category for Verdict is Guilty But Mentally Ill
Perceived Dangerousness of the Defendant
Model 6 tested the association of dispositional consequence information condition and
Perceived Dangerousness score on verdict selection. This model also controlled for participant
demographic variables. The overall model was a significant improvement on the intercept only
model (χ2 (4) = 103.76, p < .001). There was a significant effect of perceived dangerousness of
the defendant decreasing the selection of the NGRI verdict over a GBMI verdict and increasing
the selection of a guilty verdict over a GBMI verdict.
Model 7 entered the interaction of perceived dangerousness of the defendant and the
dispositional consequence information condition, and this model was only a marginally
significant improvement over the main effects model (χ2 (2) = 5.51, p = .064). However, this

61

interaction was significant for the selection of a NGRI over a GBMI verdict. Participant race had
no association with selecting a NGRI verdict, but White participants were significantly more
likely to select a guilty verdict over a GBMI verdict (OR = 2.41, 95% CI: 1.082-5.406). Women
were less likely to select a guilty verdict (OR = 0.39, 95% CI: 0.165-0.735) than men.
Comparable to all other models, education, age, and income had no association with verdict
selection (APPENDIX M).
Table 7
Multinomial Logistic Regression for Verdict by Perceived Dangerousness of Defendant,
Condition and Interaction between Perceived Dangerousness and Condition, n = 480
Predictor
B
SE B
Wald
Sig
OR
95%CI
NGRI
Perceived
dangerousness

-.535**

.166

10.386

.001

.586

.423, .811

Condition

.605**

.217

7.805

.005

1.831

1.198, 2.799

Interaction

-.601*

.261

5.279

.022

.549

.329, .916

.920**

.323

8.129

.004

2.509

1.333, 4.721

Condition

-.256

.482

.282

.595

.774

.301, 1.991

Interaction

-.212

.459

.214

.644

.809

.329, 1.989

Guilty
Perceived
dangerousness

Note. Marginal improvement of model over main effects model: χ2 (2) = 5.51, p = .064.
a
reference category for Verdict is Guilty But Mentally Ill
b
Uninformed condition was the reference category
*p < .05.
**p < .01.

62

The two-way interaction between perceived dangerousness of the defendant and dispositional
consequence information condition on the probability of selecting a NGRI are presented in
Figure 2. This plot illustrates the estimated probability of selecting a NGRI verdict by condition
as function of perceived dangerousness of the defendant. As Figure 2 shows, as levels of
perceived dangerousness decreases, the probability of selecting a NGRI verdict increases.
However, this negative association between perceived dangerousness and the selection of NGRI
verdict was stronger among the participants in the informed group. As levels of perceived
dangerousness increased, the probability of selecting a guilty verdict increased. However,
because there was no significant interaction with condition, this effect was consistent across
participants in both the informed and uninformed groups.
Summary
In sum, the majority of research hypotheses were supported. As anticipated, participants
were lacking knowledge regarding the GBMI consequences of the GBMI verdict; however, they
were more knowledgeable about the consequences of the NGRI verdict than expected. The
hypothesis that informing jurors of dispositional consequences would impact verdict selection
was supported. In addition, results showed that the effect of dispositional consequence
information on verdict selection was moderated by participant’s’ attitudes toward the insanity
defense and perceptions of the defendant’s dangerousness. Conversely, results did not support
the hypothesis that the effect of dispositional consequence information on verdict selection
would be moderated by participant’s’ attitudes toward individuals with mental illness. These
findings and their implications will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
DISCUSSION
There is a longstanding debate about how to appropriately deal with mentally ill offenders
in the American criminal justice system. In an attempt to protect mentally ill offenders,
American law distinguishes between individuals who are held criminally responsible and those
found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). Although the purpose of the insanity defense is to
help ensure fairness in the legal system, the American public has reservations regarding its use
within the criminal justice system (Briskin, & Rudolph, 1996; Cirincione, 1996). In response to
opposition against the insanity defense, the GBMI verdict was enacted in order to reduce the
number of insanity acquittals and alleviate the public’s fears. Although research on NGRI and
GBMI verdicts is abundant, questions remain regarding how a jury of lay citizens interpret and
choose these verdicts. While the public perception might be that the GBMI verdict is a middle
ground option between guilty and NGRI (Finkel, 1995; Finkel & Fulero, 1992), the reality is that
it is often more punitive than a guilty verdict. Further, while the NGRI verdict guarantees the
offender will be treated for his or her mental illness, the GBMI verdict offers no such guarantee.
Thus, would jurors actually prefer the GBMI option if they understood its consequences?
The purpose of the current study was to explore the impact of informing jurors of the
dispositional consequences of the NGRI and GBMI verdicts; that is, when jurors know what will
happen if a defendant is found GBMI or NGRI, does this knowledge influence their verdict
decisions? In addition, the study examined to what extent jurors’ attitudes toward the insanity
defense and individuals with mental illness, as well as their perception of the defendant’s
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dangerousness, might influence their verdict decisions. These ideas are addressed in five main
research hypotheses.
First, it was hypothesized that jurors are unaware of accurate dispositional consequences
of the NGRI and, in particular, the GBMI verdict. The second hypothesis was that informing
jurors of the dispositional consequences of NGRI and GBMI verdicts would influence verdict
selection. Specifically, jurors informed of dispositional consequences would be less likely to
choose a GBMI verdict. The third and fourth hypotheses were that juror attitudes toward the
insanity defense and mental illness would influence verdict selection and, specifically, that they
would intensify or diminish the impact of being informed of dispositional consequences of
GBMI and NGRI verdicts. The fifth hypothesis was that juror perceptions of the defendant’s
dangerousness would also intensify or diminish the impact of being informed of dispositional
consequences of GBMI and NGRI verdicts.
Knowledge of Dispositional Consequences
Participants responded to five questions to assess their knowledge of the GBMI and
NGRI dispositional consequences. The uninformed group represents the pre-existing awareness
that potential jurors would be expected to have about these verdict options when receiving no
dispositional consequence instruction. Results showed that in contrast to the first hypothesis the
majority of participants (77.7%) in the uninformed group were aware that the dispositional
consequence for a NGRI verdict is mandatory confinement in a mental hospital. This finding is
consistent with several other studies (Hans & Slater, 1983; Pasewark, Seidenzahl, & Pantle,
1981; Whittemore & Ogloff, 1995) and suggests that jurors are not wary of the NGRI verdict due
to a concern about where the defendant will serve his or her sentence; rather, other research has
indicated that jurors are concerned about how long he or she will be confined (Hans & Slater,
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1983; Whittemore & Ogloff, 1995). As previously discussed, this fear is unfounded because
individuals found NGRI are typically held for longer periods of time than individuals found
guilty (Linhorst, 1997; Silver, 1995). Perhaps jurors’ apprehension regarding early release could
be assuaged by including information on the average length of confinement and detailed
requirements for release in dispositional consequence instructions.
Conversely, the results supported the first hypothesis that jurors are unaware of the
accurate dispositional consequences for the GBMI verdict. A large majority of participants in the
uninformed group could not identify the correct dispositional consequence for a GBMI verdict,
which is mandatory confinement in a correctional facility. A majority of participants also
believed that the defendant was guaranteed treatment (when, if fact, they are not guaranteed
treatment), and believed that the defendant was not eligible to receive the death penalty (when, in
fact, they are eligible).
Interestingly, the majority of participants who selected the GBMI verdict erroneously
believed that the immediate fate of the defendant would be confinement in a psychiatric hospital.
This raises further questions about precisely what jurors who select the GBMI verdict presume to
be the short-term and long-term consequences for the convicted offender. It is possible they
believe that the offender will initially receive treatment in a psychiatric facility and will then be
transferred to a prison for the duration of his or her sentence. It is also possible that jurors
assume that GBMI offenders spend their entire sentence confined in a psychiatric facility.
Further clarification on jurors’ assumptions may provide greater insight into their motivations for
choosing the GBMI verdict. It has been argued that the NGRI verdict is unattractive (and GBMI
is attractive) to jurors that are seeking retribution and who believe that punishment is warranted
whether the offender is insane or not (Finkel, 1988). But if they are selecting GBMI with the
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belief that the dispositional consequence is confinement in a psychiatric facility, then retribution
might not be their primary incentive. This finding suggests that jurors have additional motives.
Perhaps, as previously discussed regarding the NGRI verdict, the GBMI verdict is appealing to
jurors because it guarantees a specific length of time that the offender is confined. Similarly,
jurors might be strongly influenced by their concerns regarding public safety.
To summarize, the uninformed group of participants’ evident lack of knowledge
regarding the GBMI verdict offers strong support for the notion that many jurors perceive GBMI
as a middle-ground verdict that acknowledges the defendant’s mental illness but still ensures
long-term confinement. These findings also lend support to the view that jurors may select the
GBMI verdict with the expectation that the defendant will be treated for his or her mental illness.
Informing Jurors of Dispositional Consequences
The second hypothesis stated that informing jurors of the dispositional consequences of
GBMI and NGRI verdicts would impact juror verdict selection. As anticipated, jurors in the
informed group were more likely to select the NGRI verdict over the GBMI verdict than
participants in the uninformed group. This finding suggests that informing jurors of the
dispositional consequences of verdicts influenced their verdict decision-making process. The
facts about the GBMI verdict and its consequences are not common knowledge (Sloat &
Frierson, 2005) and many participants may not have been aware that such a verdict option
existed before their participation in this study. Thus, perhaps it was the case that as participants
gained the understanding that the GBMI verdict involves the same sanctions as a guilty verdict
and does not guarantee treatment for the defendant, the NGRI verdict may have appeared to be
the most appropriate verdict for the seemingly mentally ill defendant presented in the case
summary.
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It is important to note that the finding of dispositional information influencing verdict
choice differs from previous studies on informing jurors of dispositional consequences.
Specifically, past studies found that informing jurors of NGRI dispositional consequences was
inconsequential until after jurors had an opportunity to deliberate (Wheatman & Shaffer, 2001;
Whittlemore, 1995). In other words, prior studies found that informing jurors of NGRI
dispositional consequences did not significantly impact pre-deliberation verdicts. The most
obvious difference between the present study and prior research is that previous investigations
focused solely on informing jurors of the dispositional consequences of the NGRI verdict; they
did not include the GBMI verdict nor any information about such a verdict. These findings
suggest that one strategy for working towards a fairer trial for mentally ill offenders would be to
provide jurors with dispositional consequence information in insanity cases, perhaps especially
when GBMI is a verdict option.
Attitudes Toward the Insanity Defense and Knowledge
The third hypothesis stated that the impact of informing jurors of dispositional
consequences on verdict selection would be moderated by juror attitudes toward the insanity
defense. There was a main effect that represents more favorable attitudes toward the insanity
defense increasing selection of a NGRI verdict over a GBMI verdict and decreasing selection of
guilty over a GBMI verdict for those in the uninformed condition. The results further showed the
predicted significant interaction between informing jurors of dispositional consequences and
attitudes toward the insanity defense on the likelihood of selecting a NGRI verdict over a GBMI
verdict. Specifically, participants who had more favorable attitudes toward the insanity defense
selected the NGRI verdict over the GBMI verdict at an even higher rate in the informed group.
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Further research would be needed to understand exactly why positive attitudes toward the
insanity defense could make jurors more influenced by dispositional consequence information.
The simplest explanation is that the participants who were informed about the GBMI and NGRI
verdict consequences became more aware of the stark differences between the two verdicts.
Once they were more accurately informed, they recognized that the consequences of the NGRI
verdict are more aligned with their positive attitudes toward the insanity defense than the
consequences of the GBMI defense. In particular, the revelation that the GBMI verdict does not
guarantee the defendant treatment might have relevant to participants with more positive
attitudes toward the insanity defense (and toward treatment of mentally ill offenders).
Another possible explanation the interaction between informing jurors of dispositional
consequences and attitudes toward the insanity defense is that participants who had preexisting
positive attitudes toward the insanity defense (and would contemplate selecting the NGRI when
they consider it appropriate) might have been more open to information that confirmed their
beliefs and, consequently, more inclined to select a NGRI verdict over the GBMI verdict. On the
other hand, jurors with negative attitudes toward the insanity defense might have been resistant
to changing their preexisting beliefs about NGRI verdict, even when presented with factual
information regarding the verdict consequences. This phenomenon is referred to by
psychologists as the perseverance bias (Anderson, 1982) and has been demonstrated in the
psychological literature of jurors’ recollection of jury instructions, perceptions of trial evidence,
and verdict selections (Finkel, 1995; Smith 1991). People are constantly using their preexisting
mental representations (also known as schemas) to better understand new experiences and, when
taking on the role of a juror, their schemas influence the way they interpret and remember case
information (Gordon, 2013). As further explained by Gordon (2013), because laypersons have
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some knowledge of the law before they take on the role of a juror, “they approach jury
instructions with an established schema in place, though it may not be a legally correct schema,
and their interpretation of the instructions they receive is necessarily influenced by that schema”
(p. 662). Along this line of thinking, it is possible that participants with favorable attitudes
toward the insanity defense were more receptive to the NGRI dispositional consequence
information because it aligned with their preexisting schemas, whereas participants with
unfavorable attitudes toward the insanity defense were less influenced by the NGRI information
because it conflicted with their established schemas. In other words, participants with
unfavorable attitudes toward the insanity defense have prior knowledge of the defense that might
hinder their comprehension of the contradictory dispositional consequence information.
Past research has also shown that participants with unfavorable attitudes toward the
insanity defense are more likely to have a retributive punishment style (i.e. “an eye for an eye”)
(Skeem et al., 2004). For those participants that prioritize seeking retribution for the defendant’s
actions, the dispositional information might make them less likely to choose the NGRI verdict
because their focus is on ensuring the punishment of the defendant. Thus, it is possible that it is a
punishment style that correlates with these attitudes toward the insanity defense that is actually
driving the effect, and future research could measure such punishment style preferences.
Attitudes Toward Mental Illness and Knowledge
The fourth hypothesis stated that more positive attitudes toward individuals with mental
illness would make participants in the informed group especially likely to choose a NGRI
verdict. There was a significant main effect that indicated that more positive attitudes toward
individuals with mental illness increases the selection of NGRI over GBMI. However, results did
not support the fourth hypothesis, indicating that participants in the informed condition did not
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select the NGRI verdict over the GBMI verdict at a greater rate than those in the uninformed
condition. The lack of significant interaction might be explained by the fact that the CAMI scale
measures attitudes toward individuals with mental illness rather than attitudes toward mentally ill
offenders (and how they are handled in the criminal justice system) specifically; therefore, the
attitudes measured by the CAMI might be less relevant when an individual is making decisions
in a legal context.
Perceived Dangerousness and Knowledge
Results supported the fifth hypothesis, which stated that the impact of informing jurors of
dispositional consequences of verdict selection would be moderated by juror perceptions of the
defendant’s dangerousness. There was a main effect that indicated that, for participants in the
uninformed condition, perceiving the defendant as more dangerous was associated with
decreased rates of choosing the NGRI verdict over the GBMI verdict and increased rates of
choosing a guilty verdict over a GBMI verdict. This finding suggests that perceiving a defendant
as dangerous seems to make jurors wary of selecting a verdict that acknowledges the defendant’s
mental illness. As discussed previously, laypersons often express concern regarding the length of
time an offender is confined when found NGRI (Hans & Slater, 1983; Whittemore & Ogloff,
1995); therefore, perhaps when jurors perceive the defendant as more dangerous they prioritize
community safety and length of confinement when they consider the verdicts and choose the
option that they believe guarantees these safeguards.
As anticipated, there was a significant interaction between informing jurors of
dispositional consequences and jurors’ perception of the defendant’s dangerousness indicating
that, for participants in the informed condition, those that perceived the defendant as less
dangerous selected a NGRI verdict more often than a GBMI verdict. It is possible that these
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participants generally perceived the defendant in a more sympathetic light and, therefore, more
deserving of treatment. Thus, when they were informed of the dispositional consequences of the
GBMI and NGRI verdicts they were more inclined to select the NGRI verdict and guarantee
treatment for the apparently mentally ill defendant.
Alternatively, the informed participants that perceived the defendant as more dangerous
could have driven the interaction effect. More precisely, it is possible that dispositional
consequence information revealed to jurors that the GBMI verdict was as restrictive as a guilty
verdict and, hence, an appropriate verdict for a defendant they perceive as dangerous. Past
research has shown that jurors prefer more punitive punishments when they perceive the
defendant as dangerous. For instance, Bowers & Steiner (1999) found that jurors in capital cases
consider the death penalty the most appropriate punishment when they believe the defendant is
dangerous. Along a similar line of thinking, perhaps the perception of dangerousness is coupled
with the notion that he is less deserving of treatment or a hopeless case that would not benefit
from treatment, therefore, the realization that he would not be guaranteed treatment was
irrelevant.
Limitations
There are a number of limitations associated with the proposed study. As with many
mock jury studies, the written summary of the case and the lack of actual court procedures (i.e.
judicial instructions, expert witness testimony, cross examination, etc.) are threats to ecological
validity. Consequently, the results may not be generalizable to real jurors and trials (Bornstein,
1999). However, it should be noted that research on the methods of presenting trial stimuli in
jury simulations found no significant differences between mock jurors’ perceptions of evidence
that read case vignettes compared to mock jurors that viewed video presentations. (Pezdek,
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Avila-Mora, & Sperry, 2010). Finally, participants did not have an opportunity to deliberate with
other jury members, which may mitigate effects that influence real-world jury verdicts, such as
conformity (Kassin, Smith, & Tulloch, 1990) and polarization (Teger & Pruitt, 1967; Isenberg,
1986). Studies have found, however, that jurors’ pre-deliberation judgments tend to be the best
predictors of the final jury verdict (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966; MacCoun & Kerr, 1988; Sandys &
Dillehay, 1995).
Since recruiting community members from MTurk is a form of convenience sampling,
internal validity is another important consideration. Internal validity refers to the adequacy of the
study design and the degree of control the researchers have exerted on the data collection. More
precisely, a study is considered internally valid when all variables except for the dependent
variable are controlled by the researchers (Litwin, 1995). As Allison (1999) points out, a
convenience sample does not come from a well-defined population and could be
unrepresentative of the target population in one or more ways. Therefore, this study should be
repeated on several samples to confirm the results.
Practical Implications
The results of the current study have practical implications for insanity cases that include
the GBMI verdict option. Bearing in mind the finding that informing jurors of dispositional
consequences impacts verdict selection, it seems logical to recommend that courts educate jurors
in insanity cases of the outcomes of GBMI and NGRI verdicts. Although research has shown that
jurors’ comprehension of jury instructions is inadequate (Elwork & Sales, 1985, Reifman,
Gusick, & Ellsworth, 1992, Rose & Ogloff, 2001; Smith, 1991, Tanford, 1991), studies have also
shown that juror comprehension can be improved if certain techniques are utilized. Specifically,
researchers have suggested writing instructions with commonly used, concrete words and short
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sentences, avoiding legal terminology, and organizing the instructions in logical format (Elwork,
Alfini & Sales, 1982).
Another strategy that has been shown to improve comprehension and recall of legal
information in civil and criminal trials is juror note-taking (FosterLee, Horowitz, & Bourgeois,
1994; Horowitz & FosterLee, 2001; Rosenhan, Eisner & Robinson, 1994). For instance,
Rosenhan et al. (1994) asked jurors to take notes during a trial simulation and then tested them
on their recall of trial information while allowing them access to their notes. The authors found
that jurors who took notes were better able to recall trial information than non-notetakers.
Specifically, results showed that 7 of the 10 highest test scores were from notetakers, while 8 of
the 10 lowest test scores were from non-notetakers. Therefore, along with providing jurors with
uncomplicated dispositional consequence instructions, it might be useful to encourage jurors to
take notes on the dispositional consequence information, which they can refer back during the
deliberation phase of the trial. While these approaches should be utilized to maximize juror
comprehension of dispositional consequence instructions, it is important to note that GBMI and
NGRI dispositional consequence information is generally less complicated than traditional jury
instructions and might be be less problematic than the instructions that were examined in prior
studies.
Future Directions
Among the few studies that informed jurors of dispositional consequences of the NGRI
verdict, significant differences in verdict selection were only found after jurors had an
opportunity to deliberate (Wheatman & Shaffer, 2001; Whittemore, date). Wheatman and
Shaffer (2001) hypothesized that when jurors have an opportunity to discuss dispositional
consequence information among their fellow jurors there is a higher likelihood that the they
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absorb the material that was taught to them. This notion is supported by a similar line of research
that showed mock jurors had a better understanding of the legal instructions after they had the
opportunity to deliberate (Devine et al, 2001; Diamond & Levi, 1996; Forston, 1975).
Although the current study found that participants in the informed group were more
knowledgeable of dispositional consequences than participants in the uninformed group, there
was plenty of room for improvement in jurors’ comprehension of the information provided to
them. Therefore, future studies should include a deliberation phase and examine if
comprehension of the dispositional consequence information is, in fact, improved postdeliberation. If so, then the impact of informing jurors of the consequences of the GBMI verdict
might be more pronounced after deliberation.
Deliberation may also have an impact on preexisting attitudes. Kewin and Shaffer (1994)
found that the relationship between jurors’ attitudes and verdict selection was significantly
stronger for the individual jurors than for the deliberating juries, suggesting that deliberation
encouraged jurors to overlook their personal biases. Therefore, future research should explore
whether the moderating influence of insanity defense attitudes is diminished after jurors have
had the opportunity to deliberate. Since research has consistently shown a relationship between
jurors’ death penalty attitudes and jurors’ legal judgements (Ellsworth, 2003; O’Neil, Patry, &
Penrod, 2004), examining the moderating effect of death penalty attitudes would be an
interesting future investigation.
With the aim of gaining further understanding of the moderating effect of defendant
characteristics on the impact of informing jurors of dispositional consequence information, future
studies could manipulate the defendant’s age (juvenile vs. adult), sex, race, psychiatric diagnosis
(personality disorder vs. schizophrenia), or mental illness symptom severity. Since jurors’
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perceptions of the defendant’s dangerousness was shown to be a relevant factor in the current
study, manipulating the crime type (armed robbery vs. murder) or the brutality of the crime
committed could also yield some interesting results.
Conclusion
The purpose of the present study was to examine the impact of informing jurors of the
dispositional consequences of the GBMI and NGRI verdicts. In addition, the moderating effects
of jurors’ pre-existing attitudes, as well as their perceptions of the defendant were explored. In
short, informing participants of dispositional consequences had the anticipated effect of
increasing the likelihood that they would select the NGRI verdict over the GBMI verdict. To the
extent that future research can corroborate these findings, the judiciary might consider providing
GBMI and NGRI dispositional consequence information. This step has the potential to minimize
juror confusion regarding the GBMI and NGRI verdicts and, in turn, protect the integrity of the
insanity defense. This is particularly crucial for the mentally ill offenders who may be less likely
to get be the treatment they need when GBMI is a verdict option.
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APPENDIX A:
LEGAL CRITERIA FOR VERDICTS

Legal criteria for a NGRI verdict:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of
mental disease or defect he [or she] lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality/wrongfulness of his [or her] conduct or to conform his [or her] conduct to the
requirements of the law. (Section 4.01 of the ALI Model Penal Code)
Legal criteria for a GBMI verdict:
A person who, at the time of the commission of a criminal offense, was not insane but was
suffering from a mental illness, is not relieved of criminal responsibility for his conduct and may
be found guilty but mentally ill (GBMI).
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APPENDIX B:
EXPLANATIONS OF DISPOSITIONAL CONSEQUENCES
Participants in the “dispositional consequences” condition will read the following outcomes.
Depending on your verdict, there are different outcomes for the defendant.
If found ‘not guilty’, the defendant will be released. It is possible that the state will seek to civilly
commit the defendant, which means he will be placed in a secure mental hospital. However, he
will not have a criminal record.
If found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI), it is very likely that the defendant will be
civilly committed to a secure psychiatric facility. The defendant will not have a criminal record.
If found guilty but mentally ill (GBMI), the defendant will be placed in a prison. He will have a
criminal conviction on his permanent record. Psychiatric treatment will be provided only if the
prison has an existing program.
If found guilty, the defendant will have a criminal conviction on his permanent record. He will
be placed in a prison. Psychiatric treatment will be provided only if the prison has an existing
program.
Essentially, a guilty but mentally ill and guilty verdict have the same outcome. (170 words)
Participants in the “no dispositional consequences” condition will read the following
paragraph.
It is important for you, a juror in this case, to evaluate all of the evidence that you have been
presented with in this trial. You should use the evidence presented and apply the law
appropriately. This means understanding how the evidence helps you reach a verdict, based on
the legal descriptions (provided above) for each of the possible verdicts. Your verdict should be
based solely on the evidence presented in this case, and not on any ideas, attitudes, or beliefs that
you hold that interfere with evaluating the evidence as objectively as possible. It is also
important to point out that the right, or correct, verdict is for you and you only to decide. Your
job in this case is to determine a verdict, and that is all. Nothing more and nothing less. By doing
so, you preserve the integrity of the criminal law in the United States, and help to shape the
democracy in which we live. This is your duty, obligation, and privilege as a citizen of the
United States of America.
(175 words)
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APPENDIX C:
INSANITY CASE VIGNETTE

Michael Jones, age 43, worked as a mail carrier for the past 10 years in an eastern city. It
was his custom to stop for lunch at McCafferty's Tavern, where he would have a hamburger and
a beer. He would leave through the back door by the kitchen because it was the most convenient
exit as he continued his mail route. At 1:15 p.m. on August 21, 1997, Jones was found dead in
the alley behind the tavern. The medical examiner's report indicated that he had bled to death
after suffering a single stab wound through his upper left chest and heart.
The defendant, Jeffrey Smith, age 24, was a dishwasher at the tavern. Eyewitnesses
reported that the defendant left his post shortly after Jones had finished lunch and paid his tab.
The defendant had been washing dishes and suddenly left, leaving the water tap running. The
defendant was arrested 2 blocks from the tavern after a patrol officer noticed him carrying a U.S.
Mail pouch. Upon arrest, he was found to have a 5-inch, blood-stained carving knife in his
possession. This knife was established as the murder weapon by blood-type matching, and it had
the defendant's fingerprints on the handle and blade. Testimony established that the knife was
from the tavern's kitchen.
A court-appointed psychologist and a psychiatrist examined the defendant. Their reports
and testimony were in agreement and indicated that the defendant had been socially isolated for
many years. During his senior year of high school, he withdrew from his peers and his school
performance deteriorated severely. After high school, he supported himself with menial jobs and
public assistance. The defendant usually looked unkempt and disheveled. His speech tended to
be vague and rambling. The connection among his ideas was difficult to follow and he often
gave irrelevant replies to questions. He was convinced that a group of aliens was conspiring to
take over the world. He believed that they had been shooting "zylon rays" at his brain in an effort
to control him. They planned to abduct him and study his brain in order to improve their
techniques of mental control. To conduct their studies unnoticed, these aliens disguised
themselves as "government men" (e.g., officials from the FBI, CIA, IRS, and Postal Service).
They intended to complete their studies, perfect their techniques of mental control, then use these
techniques to take over the world and all of its inhabitants.
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APPENDIX D:
VERDICT QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Based on the facts presented in the case summary, how do you vote?
a.
b.
c.
d.

Not Guilty
NGRI
GBMI
Guilty

2. How confident are you in this decision?
0%

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

70

75

80

85

90

95

100%
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APPENDIX E:
PERCEIVED DANGEROUSNESS QUESTIONNAIRE

The following items are exploratory. Based on principal components analysis, items were
combined into a scale as appropriate.
1. The defendant is likely to commit an act of violence in the future if he is not in a secure
facility (like a prison or mental hospital).
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree

6

7

Strongly Disagree

2. The defendant has a criminal personality.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree

6

7

Strongly Disagree

3. The defendant is a danger to society.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree

6

7

Strongly Disagree

4. The defendant has no remorse.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree

6

7

Strongly Disagree

5. How culpable (responsible) is the defendant for this crime?
1

2

3

4

Not at all culpable

5

6

7

Completely culpable
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APPENDIX F:
KNOWLEDGE OF DISPOSITIONAL CONSEQUENSES QUESTIONNAIRE
1. Based on your verdict choice, what do you believe is the immediate fate of the
defendant?
a. Confinement in a correctional facility (jail or prison)
b. Confinement in a mental hospital
c. Released back into society
The correct answer for Guilty and GBMI is A. The correct answer for NGRI is B.
2. A “Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity” (NGRI) verdict nearly always results in:
a.
b.
c.
d.

a shorter prison term for the defendant
a mandatory confinement in a mental hospital
neither a or b
both a and b
The correct answer is B.

3. A “Guilty but Mentally Ill” (GBMI) verdict nearly always results in:
a.
b.
c.
d.

mandatory confinement in a mental hospital
psychiatric treatment for the defendant in prison
neither a or b
both a and b
The correct answer is C.

4. If the defendant is found GBMI, he is not eligible to receive the death penalty.
True
False
5. If the defendant is found GBMI, he is guaranteed treatment for his mental illness.
True
False
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APPENDIX G:
INSANITY DEFENSE ATTITUDES SCALE (IDA-R)
Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements:
1. I believe that people should be held responsible for their actions no matter what their mental
condition.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
2. For the right price, psychiatrists will probably manufacture a “mental illness” for any criminal
to convince the jury that he is insane.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
3. I believe that all human beings know what they are doing and have the power to control
themselves.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
4. The insanity defense threatens public safety by telling criminals they can get away with a
crime if they come up with a good story about why they did it.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
5. A defendant’s degree of insanity is irrelevant: if he commits the crime then he should do the
time.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
6. The insanity defense returns disturbed, dangerous people to the streets.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
7. Mentally ill defendants who plead insanity have failed to exert enough willpower to behave
properly like the rest of us. So, they should be punished for their crimes like everyone else.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
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8. As a last resort, defense attorneys will encourage their clients to act strangely and lie through
their teeth in order to appear “insane.”
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
9. Perfectly sane killers get away with their crimes by hiring high-priced lawyers and experts
who misuse the insanity defense.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
10. The insanity defense is a loophole in the law that allows too many guilty people to escape
punishment.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
11. We should punish people who commit criminal acts, regardless of their degree of mental
disturbance.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
12. Many of the crazy criminals that psychiatrists see fit to return to the streets go on to kill
again.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
13. With slick attorneys and a sad story, any criminal can use the insanity defense to finagle his
way to freedom.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly agree
Strongly disagree
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APPENDIX H:
COMMUNITY ATTITUDES TOWARD MENTAL ILLNESS (CAMI)
Please note:
1) SD = Strongly Disagree, 2) D = Disagree, 3) NA nor ND = Neither Agree nor
Disagree, 4) A= Agree, and 5) SA = Strongly Agree.
1. The mentally ill should not be given any responsibility
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
2. The mentally ill should be isolated from the rest of the community
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
3. A woman would be foolish to marry a man who had suffered from a mental illness,
even though he seems fully recovered
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
4. I would not want to live next door to someone who had been mentally ill
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
5. Anyone with a history of mental problems should be excluded from taking public
office
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
6. The mentally ill should not be denied their rights
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
7. Mental patients should be encouraged to assume the responsibilities of normal life
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
8. No one has the right to exclude the mentally ill from their neighborhood
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
9. The mentally ill are far less danger than most people suppose
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
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10. most women who were once patients in a mental hospital can be trusted as
babysitters
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
11. One of the main causes of mental illness is a lack of self-discipline and will power
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
12. The best way to handle the mentally ill is to keep them behind locked doors
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
13. There is something about the mentally ill that makes it easy to tell them from
normal people
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
14. As soon as a person shows person shows signs of mental disturbances, he should be
hospitalized
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
15. Mental patients need the same kind of control and discipline as a young child
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
16. Mental illness is an illness like any other
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
17. The mentally ill should not be treated as outcasts from society
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
18. Less emphasis should be placed on protecting the public from the mentally ill
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
19. Mental hospitals are an outdated means of treating the mentally ill
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
20. Virtually anyone can become mentally ill
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
21. The mentally ill for too long have been the subject of ridicule
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
22. More tax money should be spent on the care and treatment of the mentally ill
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
23. We need to adopt a far more tolerant attitude toward the mentally ill in our society
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
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24. Our mental hospitals seem more like prisons than like places where the mentally ill
can be cared for
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
25. The mentally ill don’t deserve our sympathy
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
26. The mentally ill are a burden on society
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
27. Increased spending on mental health services is a waste of tax euro
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
28. There are sufficient existing services for the mentally ill
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
29. It is best to avoid any one who has mental problems
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
30. We have a responsibility to provide the best possible care for the mentally ill
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
31. Residents should accept the location of mental health facilities in their neighborhood
to serve the needs of the local community
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
32. The best therapy for many mental patients is to be part of a normal community
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
33. As far as possible, mental health services should be provided through community
based facilities
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
34. Locating mental health services in residential neighborhoods does not endanger local
residents
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
35. Residents have nothing to fear from people coming into their neighborhood to
obtain mental health services
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
36. Mental health facilities should be kept out of residential neighborhoods
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
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37. Local residents have a good reason to resist the location of mental health services in
their neighborhood
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
38. Having mental patients living within residential neighborhoods might be good
therapy but the risks to residents are too great
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
39. It is frightening to think of people with mental problems living in residential
neighborhoods
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
40. Locating mental health facilities in a residential area downgrades the neighborhood
1) SD 2) D 3) NA nor ND 4) A 5) SA
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APPENDIX I:
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE
Instructions: In this section of the questionnaire, we’d like to ask you a few general background
questions about yourself. Recall that all answers to this questionnaire are confidential and
anonymous.
1. Current Age ______________
2. Gender (circle one):
3. Are you a U.S. citizen?

MALE
NO

FEMALE
YES

4. What is your highest completed educational level:
______
______
______
______
______
______

Some high school
High school diploma
Undergraduate degree
Professional degree
Master’s degree
Doctoral degree

5. Are you of Hispanic/Latino ethnicity? NO

YES

6. What is your race? (check the one which best describes you):
______
______
______
______
______
______

Black/African American
Asian/Pacific Islander
White/Caucasian
Middle Eastern
Mixed
Other _________________________

7. Do you have a State Identification or Driver’s License?
8.

How would you evaluate your political views:
1. Liberal
2. Slightly Liberal

100

NO

YES

3.
4.

Slightly Conservative
Conservative

9. My personal income (before taxes) would fall in the following ranges? (check one)
______
______
______
______
______
______

0-$15,000
$15,001-$30,000
$30,001-$45,000
$45,001-$60,000
$60,001-$75,000
$75,001 or more

10. Do you actively practice any religion?

NO

11.

Have you ever been called for jury duty before?
NO
YES

12.

Have you ever served on a jury before?
NO
YES

13.

If yes, was the trial:
1. Civil
2. Criminal
3. Both
4. Not applicable

14.

Were you the foreperson on the jury?
1. No
2. Yes
3. Not applicable

YES

15. Have you ever been diagnosed with a mental illness?

NO

YES

16. Has someone you are close to been diagnosed with a mental illness? NO
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YES

APPENDIX J:
Multinomial Logistic Regression for Verdict by Condition With Demographic Variables, n = 480
Predictor
B
SE B
Wald
Sig
OR
95%CI
NGRI
Race

.092

.262

.123

Sex

-.521*

.206

Education

.062

.090

.467

.494

1.064

Income

-.117

.081

2.078

.149

.890

Age

.006

.008

.609

.435

1.006

Condition

.536**

.200

7.207

.007

1.709

Race

.830*

.399

4.337

.037

2.293

1.050, 5.008

Sex

-.930*

.366

6.474

.011

.394

.193, .808

Education

-.237

.176

1.829

.176

.789

.559, 1.112

Income

.060

.143

.176

.675

1.062

.803, 1.404

Age

.001

.015

.006

.938

1.001

.972, 1.032

.038

.846

6.424

.726
.011

1.096
.594

.656, 1.833
.397, .889
.891, 1.269
.759, 1.043
.990, 1.023
1.156, 2.526

Guilty

Condition

-.070

.360

.932

.460, 1.889

Note. Improvement of model over intercept only model: χ2(12) = 27.72, p = .006.
a
reference category for Verdict is Guilty But Mentally Ill
b
Uninformed condition is the reference category, c reference category for sex is male, dreference category for race is
white.
*p < .05, **p < .01.
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APPENDIX K:
Multinomial Logistic Regression for Verdict by Insanity Defense Attitude, Condition,
and Interaction between Insanity Defense Attitude and Condition, n = 480
Predictor
B
SE B
Wald
Sig
OR

95%CI

NGRI
Race

.154

.287

Sex

-.407

.224

Education

-.066

.100

.441

.507

Income

-.074

.088

.706

.401

.929

Age

.005

.009

.326

.568

1.005

Condition

.509*

.226

5.073

.024

1.664

1.068, 2.591

.436**

.135

10.434

.001

1.547

1.187, 2.015

.550**

.198

7.719

.005

1.733

1.176, 2.555

Race

.961*

.428

5.036

.025

2.614

1.129, 6.049

Sex

-1.171**

.395

8.790

.003

.310

.143, .672

Education

-.268

.187

2.061

.151

.765

.530, 1.103

Income

.035

.155

.052

.819

1.036

.765, 1.403

Age

-.004

.016

.060

.806

.996

.965, 1.028

2.001

.157

Insanity Attitudes
Interaction

.289
3.291

.591
.070

1.167
.665
.936

.665, 2.048
.429, 1.033
.770, 1.138
.782, 1.103
.987, 1.023

Guilty

Condition

-.910

.643

.403

.114, 1.420

Insanity Attitudes

-.862**

.259

11.035

.001

.422

.254, .702

Interaction

-.191

.393

.235

.628

.827

.383, 1.785

Note. Improvement of interaction model over main effects model: χ2 (2) = 8.34, p = .015.
a
reference category for Verdict is Guilty But Mentally Ill
b
Uninformed condition is the reference category
c
reference category for sex is male, dreference category for race is white.
*p < .05.
**p < .01
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APPENDIX L:
Multinomial Logistic Regression for Verdict by Mental Illness Attitude, Condition,
and Interaction between Mental Illness Attitude and Condition, n = 480
Predictor
B
SE B
Wald
Sig
OR

95%CI

NGRI
Race

.168

.269

.388

.534

1.182

Sex

-.710**

.216

10.78

.001

Education

.003

.094

.001

.974

1.003

Income

-.088

.084

1.099

.295

.916

Age

.010

.009

1.26

.260

1.010

Condition

.536*

.207

6.688

.010

1.430

1.138, 2.563

Mental Illness Att

.358

.185

3.739

.053

1.430

.995, 2.055

Interaction

.344

.245

1.970

.160

1.410

.873, 2.280

.773

.405

3.637

.056

2.166

.979, 4.793

-.754*

.374

4.072

.044

.470

.226, .979

Education

-.206

.178

1.342

.247

.814

.574, 1.153

Income

-.206

.147

.115

.735

1.051

.788, 1.401

Age

.000

.016

.000

.988

1.000

.969, 1.031

.808

.369

.492

.698, 2.004
.322, .751
.835, 1.205
.777, 1.079
.993, 1.027

Guilty
Race
Sex

Condition

-.390

.434

.677

.289, 1.585

Mental Illness Att

-.334

.289

1.335

.248

.716

.407, 1.261

Interaction

-.345

.422

.669

.414

.708

.310, 1.619

Note. No improvement of interaction model over main effects: χ2 (2) = 3.10, p = .21
a
reference category for Verdict is Guilty But Mentally Ill
b
Uninformed condition is the reference category
c
reference category for sex is male, dreference category for race is white.
*p < .05.
**p < .01
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APPENDIX M:
Multinomial Logistic Regression for Verdict by Perceived Dangerousness, Condition,
and Interaction between Perceived Dangerousness and Condition, n = 480
Predictor
B
SE B
Wald
Sig
OR

95%CI

NGRI
Race

-.002

.280

Sex

-.396

.220

Education

-.001

.096

.000

.994

.999

Income

-.056

.086

.427

.513

.946

Age

.004

.009

.243

.622

1.004

Condition

.605**

.217

7.805

.005

1.831

1.198, 2.799

-.535**

.166

10.386

.001

.586

.423, .811

-.601*

.261

5.279

.022

.549

.329, .916

Race

.883*

.410

4.628

.031

2.418

1.082, 5.406

Sex

-1.054**

.381

7.665

.006

.349

.165, .735

Education

-.184

.180

1.046

.306

.832

.584, 1.184

Income

.041

.152

.072

.788

1.042

.773, 1.403

Age

-.002

.016

.013

.909

.998

.967, 1.031

.282

.595

Perceived Danger
Interaction

.000
3.243

.994
.072

.998
.673

.576, 1.728
.437, 1.036
.827, 1.207
.800, 1.118
.987, 1.022

Guilty

Condition

-.256

.482

.774

.301, 1.991

Perceived Danger

.920**

.323

8.129

.004

2.509

1.333, 4.721

Interaction

-.212

.459

.214

.644

.809

.329, 1.989

Note. Marginal improvement of model over main effects model: χ2 (2) = 5.51, p = .064.
a
reference category for Verdict is Guilty But Mentally Ill
b
Uninformed condition is the reference category
c
reference category for sex is male, dreference category for race is white.
*p < .05.
**p < .01
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APPENDIX N:
FIGURE 1
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Figure 1. Estimated probabilities of selecting NGRI as a function of insanity defense attitudes
and dispositional consequence information condition

Attitudes toward Insanity Defense (centered)
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APPENDIX O:
FIGURE 2

1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0

No
Information

2.06

1.16

0.26

-0.64

-1.54

-2.44

Information

-3.72

Probability of NGRI Verdict

Figure 2. Estimated probabilities of selecting NGRI as a function of perceived dangerousness
and dispositional consequence information condition

Perceived Dangerousness of the Defendant (centered)
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Copyright Notice: Disclaimer
You must include the following copyright and permission notice in connection with any
reproduction of the licensed material:
"Springer book/journal title, chapter/article title, volume, year of publication, page, name(s) of
author(s), (original copyright notice as given in the publication in which the material was
originally published) "With permission of Springer"
In case of use of a graph or illustration, the caption of the graph or illustration must be
included, as it is indicated in the original publication.
Warranties: None

110

Springer makes no representations or warranties with respect to the licensed material and
adopts on its own behalf the limitations and disclaimers established by CCC on its behalf in its
Billing and Payment terms and conditions for this licensing transaction.
Indemnity
You hereby indemnify and agree to hold harmless Springer and CCC, and their respective
officers, directors, employees and agents, from and against any and all claims arising out of
your use of the licensed material other than as specifically authorized pursuant to this license.
No Transfer of License
This license is personal to you and may not be sublicensed, assigned, or transferred by you
without Springer's written permission.
No Amendment Except in Writing
This license may not be amended except in a writing signed by both parties (or, in the case of
Springer, by CCC on Springer's behalf).
Objection to Contrary Terms
Springer hereby objects to any terms contained in any purchase order, acknowledgment, check
endorsement or other writing prepared by you, which terms are inconsistent with these terms
and conditions or CCC's Billing and Payment terms and conditions. These terms and
conditions, together with CCC's Billing and Payment terms and conditions (which are
incorporated herein), comprise the entire agreement between you and Springer (and CCC)
concerning this licensing transaction. In the event of any conflict between your obligations
established by these terms and conditions and those established by CCC's Billing and Payment
terms and conditions, these terms and conditions shall control.
Jurisdiction
All disputes that may arise in connection with this present License, or the breach thereof, shall
be settled exclusively by arbitration, to be held in the Federal Republic of Germany, in
accordance with German law.
Other conditions:
V 12AUG2015
Questions? customercare@copyright.com or +1-855-239-3415 (toll free in the US) or +1978-646-2777.

111

APPENDIX Q:
12/5/2016 RightsLink Printable License
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS LICENSE TERMS AND CONDITIONS
This Agreement between Erin Cotrone ("You") and Oxford University Press ("Oxford University
Press") consists of your license details and the terms and conditions provided by Oxford
University Press and Copyright Clearance Center.
Dec 05, 2016
License Number 4002260215806
License date Dec 04, 2016
Licensed content publisher Oxford University Press
Licensed content publication Schizophrenia Bulletin
Licensed content title Scaling Community Attitudes Toward the Mentally Ill
Licensed content author S. Martin Taylor, Michael J. Dear
Licensed content date 01/01/1981
Type of Use Thesis/Dissertation
Institution name
Title of your work The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict
Publisher of your work n/a
Expected publication date Dec 2016
Permissions cost 0.00 USD
Value added tax 0.00 USD
112

Total 0.00 USD
Requestor Location Erin Cotrone 4859 28th street south unit A
ARLINGTON, VA 22206 United States Attn: Erin Cotrone
Publisher Tax ID GB125506730
Billing Type Invoice
Billing Address Erin Cotrone 4859 28th street south unit A
ARLINGTON, VA 22206 United States Attn: Erin Cotrone
Total 0.00 USD
Terms and Conditions
STANDARD TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR REPRODUCTION OF MATERIAL FROM
AN OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS JOURNAL
1. Use of the material is restricted to the type of use specified in your order details. 2. This
permission covers the use of the material in the English language in the following territory:
world. If you have requested additional permission to translate this material, the
http://s100.copyright.com/CustomerAdmin/PrintableLicense.jsp?appSource=cccAdmin&licenseI
D=2016120_1480910327806 1/2
12/5/2016 RightsLink Printable License
terms and conditions of this reuse will be set out in clause 12. 3. This permission is limited to
the particular use authorized in (1) above and does not allow you to sanction its use elsewhere in
any other format other than specified above, nor does it apply to quotations, images, artistic
works etc that have been reproduced from other sources which may be part of the material to be
used. 4. No alteration, omission or addition is made to the material without our written consent.
Permission must be re-cleared with Oxford University Press if/when you decide to reprint. 5.
The following credit line appears wherever the material is used: author, title, journal, year,
volume, issue number, pagination, by permission of Oxford University Press or the sponsoring
society if the journal is a society journal. Where a journal is being published on behalf of a
learned society, the details of that society must be included in the credit line. 6. For the
reproduction of a full article from an Oxford University Press journal for whatever purpose, the
corresponding author of the material concerned should be informed of the proposed use. Contact

113

details for the corresponding authors of all Oxford University Press journal contact can be found
alongside either the abstract or full text of the article concerned, accessible from
www.oxfordjournals.org Should there be a problem clearing these rights, please contact
journals.permissions@oup.com 7. If the credit line or acknowledgement in our publication
indicates that any of the figures, images or photos was reproduced, drawn or modified from an
earlier source it will be necessary for you to clear this permission with the original publisher as
well. If this permission has not been obtained, please note that this material cannot be included in
your publication/photocopies. 8. While you may exercise the rights licensed immediately upon
issuance of the license at the end of the licensing process for the transaction, provided that you
have disclosed complete and accurate details of your proposed use, no license is finally effective
unless and until full payment is received from you (either by Oxford University Press or by
Copyright Clearance Center (CCC)) as provided in CCC's Billing and Payment terms and
conditions. If full payment is not received on a timely basis, then any license preliminarily
granted shall be deemed automatically revoked and shall be void as if never granted. Further, in
the event that you breach any of these terms and conditions or any of CCC's Billing and Payment
terms and conditions, the license is automatically revoked and shall be void as if never granted.
Use of materials as described in a revoked license, as well as any use of the materials beyond the
scope of an unrevoked license, may constitute copyright infringement and Oxford University
Press reserves the right to take any and all action to protect its copyright in the materials. 9. This
license is personal to you and may not be sublicensed, assigned or transferred by you to any
other person without Oxford University Press’s written permission. 10. Oxford University Press
reserves all rights not specifically granted in the combination of (i) the license details provided
by you and accepted in the course of this licensing transaction, (ii) these terms and conditions
and (iii) CCC’s Billing and Payment terms and conditions. 11. You hereby indemnify and agree
to hold harmless Oxford University Press and CCC, and their respective officers, directors,
employs and agents, from and against any and all claims arising out of your use of the licensed
material other than as specifically authorized pursuant to this license. 12. Other Terms and
Conditions: v1.4
Questions? customercare@copyright.com or +1-855-239-3415 (toll free in the US) or
+1-978-646-2777.

114
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Erin Cotrone Criminology 4202 E. Fowler Avenue Tampa, FL 33612
RE: Exempt Certification
IRB#: Pro00026698
Title: The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: Assessing the impact of Informing Jurors of Verdict
Consequences
Dear Ms. Cotrone:
On 6/15/2016, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) determined that your research meets criteria
for exemption from the federal regulations as outlined by 45CFR46.101(b):
(2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement),
survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior, unless: (i)
information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified, directly
or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the human subjects'
responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil
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As the principal investigator for this study, it is your responsibility to ensure that this research is
conducted as outlined in your application and consistent with the ethical principles outlined in
the Belmont Report and with USF HRPP policies and procedures.
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of South Florida and your continued commitment to human research protections. If you have any
questions regarding this matter, please call 813-974-5638.
Sincerely,
Kristen Salomon, Ph.D., Vice Chairperson USF Institutional Review Board
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